What hides behind the fixed-term contracts wage gap?

In Portugal, about 20% of full-time workers are employed under a fixed-term contract. Using a rich longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset for Portugal, with more than 20 million observations and covering the 2002-2012 period, we confirm the common idea that fixed-term contracts are not desirable when compared to permanent ones, by estimating a conditional wage gap of -1.7 log points. Then, we evaluate the sources of that wage penalty by combining a three way high-dimensional fixed effects model with the decomposition of Gelbach (2014), in which the three dimensions considered are the worker’s unobserved ability, the firm’s compensation wage policy and the job title effect. It is shown that the average worker with a fixed-term contract is less productive than his/her permanent counterparts, explaining -3.92 log points of the FTC wage penalty. Additionally, the sorting of workers into lower-paid job titles is also responsible for -0.59 log points of the wage gap. Surprisingly, we found that the allocation of workers among firms mitigates the existing wage penalty (in 4.23 log points), as fixed-term workers are concentrated into firms with a more generous compensation policy. Finally, following Figueiredo et al. (2014), we further control for the worker-firm match characteristics and reach the conclusion that fixed-term employment relationships have an overrepresentation of low quality worker-firm matches, explaining 0.65 log points of the FTC wage penalty.

Contingent contracts

International businesses bring with them additional negotiation complexities and extra risks, thus calling for negotiation integrative solutions and additional legal protection. The recent economic crisis forced, companies, including SMEs, to look for international markets and face these additional complexities and issues. In the search for a practical and simplified solution, to serve less sophisticated companies, this paper brings insights from the negotiation literature to a specific legal issue. Specifically, I investigate the negotiation and use of contingent agreements as a tool for facilitating the negotiation process and managing risk in international deals. Looking into an international sale of goods from Portugal to Brazil, this paper proposes the structuring of two contingent contracts related to two category of products in order to demonstrate the potential benefits of some of its relevant features, specifically the creation of incentives and identification and allocation of future risks. In general, the structuring of contingent agreements is likely to provide positive results in mitigating the issues of lack of trust and dealing with the additional risks derived from international deals, therefore facilitating and improving the overall quality of the deal.