On project finance and the first road concession in Portugal

In broad sense, Project Financing1 as a mean of financing large scale infrastructural projects worldwide has had a steady growth in popularity for the last 20 years. This growth has been relatively unscathed from most economic cycles. However in the wake of the 2007 systemic Financial Crisis, Project Financing was also in trouble. The liquidity freeze and credit crunch that ensued affected all parties involved. Traditional Lenders, of this type of financial instrument, locked-in long-term contractual obligations, were severely hit with scarcity of funding compounded by rapidly increasing cost of funding. All the while, Banks were “rescued” by the concerted actions of Central Banks and other Multi-Lateral Agencies around the world but at the same time “stressed” by upcoming regulatory effort (Basel Committee). This impact resulted in specific changes to this type of long-term financing. Changes such as Commercial Banks’ increased risk aversion; pricing increase and maturities decrease of credit facilities; enforcement of Market Disruption Event clauses; partial responsibility for project risk by Multilateral Agencies; and adoption of utility-like availability payments in other industrial sectors such as transportation and even social infrastructure. To the extent possible, this report is then divided in three parts. First, it begins with a more instructional part, touching academic literature (theory) and giving the Banks perspective (practice), but mostly as an overview of Project Finance for awareness’ sake. The renowned Harvard Business School professor – Benjamin Esty, states2 that Project Finance is a “relatively unexplored territory for both empirical and theoretical research” which means that academic research efforts are lagging the practice of Project Finance. Second, the report presents a practical case regarding the first Road Concession in Portugal in 1998 ending with the lessons learned 10 years after Financial Close. Lastly, the report concludes with the analysis of the current trends and changes to the industry post Financial Crisis of the late 2000’s. To achieve this I’ll reference relevant papers, books on the subject, online articles and my own experience in the Project Finance Department at a major Portuguese Investment Bank. Regarding the latter, with the signing of a confidentiality agreement, I’m duly omitting sensitive and proprietary bank information.

The compliance function in banking: Perspective and future in the age of globalization

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The financial system in Mozambique: Opportunities, barriers and market potential

This research is empirical and exploratory intending to analyse the attractiveness of banking in Mozambique, considering its positive outlook. To identify the opportunities and barriers, the methods adopted were elite interviews with banking executives, complemented by secondary data. The opportunities for new entrants seem to include bankarization and the emergence of micro and smallmedium enterprises; other avenues seem to include investment banking, support of mega-projects (e.g. energy, infrastructures) through syndicates and cooperation with multilaterals, and the participation in developing capital markets. Conversely, the main barriers include shortage of talent, inadequate infrastructures, poverty, unsophisticated entrepreneurial culture (e.g. informal economy, inadequate financial reporting), burdensome bureaucracy (e.g. visas), foreign exchange regulation, as well as low liquidity and high funding costs for banks. The key conclusions suggest a window of opportunity for niche markets, and new products and services in retail and investment banking.

Home Banking

The object of this dissertation is focused on the study of the home banking service and how the allocation of losses due to computer fraud is processed in the scope of this service. When considering the questions raised by the allocation of losses associated with fraudulent operations, it is important to consider, mainly, the behaviour of the user of the home banking service. In our opinion, courts have been too demanding towards the user when judging his action in the use of this service. In this study, we have concluded that, when the user “falls” into a computer fraud scheme, he should not be liable for gross negligent behaviour, even if, due to the fraud, the user revealed all his access codes to a hacker on a page similar to that of his bank. In general, such facts will not be sufficient to qualify the user’s action as grossly negligent. Therefore, the user, under the terms of the Payment Services’ System, must bear the loss up to a maximum of €150, and the bank will face the remainder of the losses. However, if the user, victim of a fraudulent technique, ignored the safety warnings issued by the bank, one must consider, given the specific case, that he contributed to gross negligence in unauthorised payment transactions. Thus, the user must bear all the losses up to the moment when he notifies the bank about the unauthorised transactions. It is the bank’s responsibility to, given the specific case, adduce evidence of the client’s contribution to the identified losses.

The new economy: Essays in network economics and two-sided markets

Following the Introduction, which surveys existing literature on the technology advances and regulation in telecommunications and on two-sided markets, we address specific issues on the industries of the New Economy, featured by the existence of network effects. We seek to explore how each one of these industries work, identify potential market failures and find new solutions at the economic regulation level promoting social welfare. In Chapter 1 we analyze a regulatory issue on access prices and investments in the telecommunications market. The existing literature on access prices and investment has pointed out that networks underinvest under a regime of mandatory access provision with a fixed access price per end-user. We propose a new access pricing rule, the indexation approach, i.e., the access price, per end-user, that network i pays to network j is function of the investment levels set by both networks. We show that the indexation can enhance economic efficiency beyond what is achieved with a fixed access price. In particular, access price indexation can simultaneously induce lower retail prices and higher investment and social welfare as compared to a fixed access pricing or a regulatory holidays regime. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions under which the indexation can implement the socially optimal investment or the Ramsey solution, which would be impossible to obtain under fixed access pricing. Our results contradict the notion that investment efficiency must be sacrificed for gains in pricing efficiency. In Chapter 2 we investigate the effect of regulations that limit advertising airtime on advertising quality and on social welfare. We show, first, that advertising time regulation may reduce the average quality of advertising broadcast on TV networks. Second, an advertising cap may reduce media platforms and firms' profits, while the net effect on viewers (subscribers) welfare is ambiguous because the ad quality reduction resulting from a regulatory cap o¤sets the subscribers direct gain from watching fewer ads. We find that if subscribers are sufficiently sensitive to ad quality, i.e., the ad quality reduction outweighs the direct effect of the cap, a cap may reduce social welfare. The welfare results suggest that a regulatory authority that is trying to increase welfare via regulation of the volume of advertising on TV might necessitate to also regulate advertising quality or, if regulating quality proves impractical, take the effect of advertising quality into consideration. 3 In Chapter 3 we investigate the rules that govern Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs). In EPNs the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge at most the same amount for a payment card transaction as for cash. In this chapter, we analyze a three- party model (consumers, merchants, and a proprietary EPN) with endogenous transaction volumes and heterogenous merchants' transactional benefits of accepting cards to assess the welfare impacts of the NSR. We show that, if merchants are local monopolists and the network externalities from merchants to cardholders are sufficiently strong, with the exception of the EPN, all agents will be worse o¤ with the NSR, and therefore the NSR is socially undesirable. The positive role of the NSR in terms of improvement of retail price efficiency for cardholders is also highlighted.