Proving a market for a startup befor scaling using the hypothesis-driven entrepreneurship process

The year is 2015 and the startup and tech business ecosphere has never seen more activity. In New York City alone, the tech startup industry is on track to amass $8 billion dollars in total funding – the highest in 7 years (CB Insights, 2015). According to the Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurship (2015), this figure represents just 20% of the total funding in the United States. Thanks to platforms that link entrepreneurs with investors, there are simply more funding opportunities than ever, and funding can be initiated in a variety of ways (angel investors, venture capital firms, crowdfunding). And yet, in spite of all this, according to Forbes Magazine (2015), nine of ten startups will fail. Because of the unpredictable nature of the modern tech industry, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly why 90% of startups fail – but the general consensus amongst top tech executives is that “startups make products that no one wants” (Fortune, 2014). In 2011, author Eric Ries wrote a book called The Lean Startup in attempts to solve this all-too-familiar problem. It was in this book where he developed the framework for The Hypothesis-Driven Entrepreneurship Process, an iterative process that aims at proving a market before actually launching a product. Ries discusses concepts such as the Minimum Variable Product, the smallest set of activities necessary to disprove a hypothesis (or business model characteristic). Ries encourages acting briefly and often: if you are to fail, then fail fast. In today’s fast-moving economy, an entrepreneur cannot afford to waste his own time, nor his customer’s time. The purpose of this thesis is to conduct an in-depth of analysis of Hypothesis-Driven Entrepreneurship Process, in order to test market viability of a reallife startup idea, ShowMeAround. This analysis will follow the scientific Lean Startup approach; for the purpose of developing a functional business model and business plan. The objective is to conclude with an investment-ready startup idea, backed by rigorous entrepreneurial study.

On project finance and the first road concession in Portugal

In broad sense, Project Financing1 as a mean of financing large scale infrastructural projects worldwide has had a steady growth in popularity for the last 20 years. This growth has been relatively unscathed from most economic cycles. However in the wake of the 2007 systemic Financial Crisis, Project Financing was also in trouble. The liquidity freeze and credit crunch that ensued affected all parties involved. Traditional Lenders, of this type of financial instrument, locked-in long-term contractual obligations, were severely hit with scarcity of funding compounded by rapidly increasing cost of funding. All the while, Banks were “rescued” by the concerted actions of Central Banks and other Multi-Lateral Agencies around the world but at the same time “stressed” by upcoming regulatory effort (Basel Committee). This impact resulted in specific changes to this type of long-term financing. Changes such as Commercial Banks’ increased risk aversion; pricing increase and maturities decrease of credit facilities; enforcement of Market Disruption Event clauses; partial responsibility for project risk by Multilateral Agencies; and adoption of utility-like availability payments in other industrial sectors such as transportation and even social infrastructure. To the extent possible, this report is then divided in three parts. First, it begins with a more instructional part, touching academic literature (theory) and giving the Banks perspective (practice), but mostly as an overview of Project Finance for awareness’ sake. The renowned Harvard Business School professor – Benjamin Esty, states2 that Project Finance is a “relatively unexplored territory for both empirical and theoretical research” which means that academic research efforts are lagging the practice of Project Finance. Second, the report presents a practical case regarding the first Road Concession in Portugal in 1998 ending with the lessons learned 10 years after Financial Close. Lastly, the report concludes with the analysis of the current trends and changes to the industry post Financial Crisis of the late 2000’s. To achieve this I’ll reference relevant papers, books on the subject, online articles and my own experience in the Project Finance Department at a major Portuguese Investment Bank. Regarding the latter, with the signing of a confidentiality agreement, I’m duly omitting sensitive and proprietary bank information.