Firms survival and international trade: The impact of exports and imports

Double Degree. A Work Project presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters in Management from Nova School of Business and Economics and Maastricht University.

The graduate: Spillovers from the entry of the first worker with a college degree in a firm

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Double Degree in Economics from NOVA School of Business and Economics and Maastricht School of Business and Economics

Shiva's dance: Crisis, local institutions and private firms

The uneven spatial distribution of start-ups and their respective survival may reflect comparative advantages resulting from the local institutional background. For the first time, we explore this idea using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to assess the relative efficiency of Portuguese municipalities in this specific context. We depart from the related literature where expenditure is perceived as a desirable input by choosing a measure of fiscal responsibility and infrastructural variables in the first stage. Comparing results for 2006 and 2010, we find that mean performance decreased substantially 1) with the effects of the Global Financial Crisis, 2) as municipal population increases and 3) as financial independence decreases. A second stage is then performed employing a double-bootstrap procedure to evaluate how the regional context outside the control of local authorities (e.g. demographic characteristics and political preferences) impacts on efficiency.

To what extent do aspects of sustainability impact established firms' resilience

An organizations´ level of sustainability has so far been primarily been analyzed within the context of economic performance. This study changes that dependent variable to “resilience”, namely a company’s ability to recover from potential lethal shocks or disruptive events. The research questions aims to investigate whether sustainability and resilience are related. This study utilizes the financial crisis from 2007/08 as disruptive event, as it encompassed market phase-out but also survival by established firms. Two Swiss luxury watchmaking companies have been chosen as industry sample and the study’s investigation is based on a comparative case study approach. The latter applies both quantitative data, in the form of the respective annual company reports, and qualitative data, in the form of semi-structured interviews with three stakeholder groups. Findings indicate that the investigated measures of sustainability are related the investigated companies’ level of resilience. These findings contribute to the building of new theory towards resilience as this study outlines specifically which measures have been proven to be of relevance for companies’ resilience. Moreover, the results are of high relevance for companies that are operating in constant evolving markets and struggling adapting to any disruptive environment as it is outlined why and how comparative companies have to be sustainable in order to become more resilient towards future shocks.

Competition policy costs to firms

The existence of competition policy forces companies to adjust their behaviour. This is also costly. Using a database from a company on contracts, I will try to estimate if a specific competition policy disposition, supply contracts cannot be longer than 60 months, has costs for the coffee suppliers operating in the Portuguese “on-trade” coffee market. The estimation method used in this paper will be OLS. The results suggest that limiting the duration of exclusivity contracts to 60 months can be harmful to the coffee suppliers and it can even seriously affect the market functioning. Key

Differences and reasons in IASB accounting standards between small and large companies

This paper studies the main differences in accounting standards of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) between small and large companies, materialised in the dissimilarities between the International Financial Reporting Standard for Small and Medium-sized Entities and the full International Financial Reporting Standards, as of 2010. Another element of this project is the analysis of the reasons behind the differences between the two aforementioned frameworks, which intends to expose the rationale and the mindset that led to an adaptation of the full standards in a stand-alone document designed for small companies.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

When not-for-profit try to influence firms

I study the influence of not-for-profit entities in companies, through shareholders proposals in the U.S. largest companies. This paper analyzes the not-for-profit entities involved, the issues addressed by the proposals and the financial characteristics of target companies, as well as market reactions and voting outcomes. Results indicate that not-for-profit entities tend to target companies with higher profitability and value more frequently than general investors. Furthermore, the voting outcome is influenced by insider ownership and types of proposals. Finally, market reactions change with profitability, leverage, ownership structure and types of proposals.

Universal banks and corporate control: Evidence from the global syndicated loan market

We investigate the effects of bank control over borrower firms whether by representation on boards of directors or by the holding of shares through bank asset management divisions. Using a large sample of syndicated loans, we find that banks are more likely to act as lead arrangers in loans when they exert some control over the borrower firm. Bank-firm governance links are associated with higher loan spreads during the 2003-2006 credit boom, but lower spreads during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Additionally, these links mitigate credit rationing effects during the crisis. The results are robust to several methods to correct for the endogeneity of the bank- firm governance link. Our evidence, consistent with intertemporal smoothing of loan rates, suggests there are costs and benefits from banks’ involvement in firm governance.

Bias in returns to tenure when firm wages and employment comove: A quantitative assessment and solution

It is well known that, unless worker-firm match quality is controlled for, returns to firm tenure (RTT) estimated directly via reduced form wage (Mincer) equations will be biased. In this paper we show that even if match quality is properly controlled for there is a further pervasive source of bias, namely the co-movement of firm employment and firm wages. In a simple mechanical model where human capital is absent and separation is exogenous we show that positively covarying shocks (either aggregate or firm level) to firms employment and wages cause downward bias in OLS regression estimates of RTT. We show that the long established procedures for dealing with "traditional" RTT bias do not circumvent the additional problem we have identified. We argue that if a reduced form estimation of RTT is undertaken, firm-year fixed effects must be added in order to eliminate this bias. Estimates from two large panel datasets from Portugal and Germany show that the bias is empirically important. Adding firm-year fixed effects to the regression increases estimates of RTT in the two respective countries by between 3.5% and 4.5% of wages at 20 years of tenure over 80% (50%) of the estimated RTT level itself. The results extend to tenure correlates used in macroeconomics such as the minimum unemployment rate since joining the firm. Adding firm-year fixed effects changes estimates of these effects also.

The relationship between the education level of successor's and the firm performance in German publicly listed family firms- an empirical analysis

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how far the education level of the second or third generation of publicly traded German family firms affects the post-succession firm performance. By conducting a correlational and regression design, the aim is to examine how several variables influence the performance of family firms. Performance measures, for example ROA and Tobin’s q and variables, like Education level and succession periods, examine analytically that a positive succession trend will occur. However, with the used model, only a less rigid model shows empirical evidence.