Drivers of participation in collaborative consumption ventures

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Humor impresso: cultura e política em O Espreitador do Mundo Novo

The aim of this paper is to identify, analyse and question the expressions of humour in O Espreitador do Mundo Novo, a monthly periodical published by José Daniel Rodrigues da Costa throughout 1802. It is a chapter of a PhD thesis in History and Theory of Ideas with the title “Correcting by laughter. Humour in Portuguese periodical press 1797-1834”. Positing humour as a social and cultural phenomenon, it is regarded here in a broad sense, comprehending wit, joke, ridicule, satire, jest, mockery, facetiousness or irony, displayed with recourse to various figures of speech. This interdisciplinary work intends listing and researching the themes and issues of the periodical and its targets, namely the social, age or gender stereotypes and to acknowledge its political stances. Another main purpose of this paper is to assess the role of humour as expressed in the printed periodical as a political and social weapon, criticizing ways (and which ways) and/or fashions, often ridiculing novelty just for being new in order to maintain the statu quo, and to establish in which senses humour was used in the context of late Ancien Régime and early liberalism culture. The humour of O Espreitador has also played a part in framing a public sphere in early nineteenth-century Portugal, as can be seen by the different “stages” and backgrounds where the monthly installments of the periodical take place: squares, coffee houses, fairgrounds, private houses, jailhouses, churches, public promenades, pilgrimages, bullfights, parties, the opera house – each of them a space of sociability and socialization. In this one, as in other periodicals of the time, printed humour stands at the crossroads of politics and culture, in spaces boldly widening before the reader. Albeit, there are quite a few loud silences in O Espreitador: not even the slightest remark to the church, the clergy or the Inquisition, only reverential references to the established order and the powers that be. The periodical criticizes the criticizers; it is against those who are against. The repeated disclaimers are intended not only to protect the author from libel suits or other litigation. They belong to a centuries-old tradition which, as early as the Middle Ages, has set apart escárnio (scorn) from maldizer (slander): José Daniel Rodrigues da Costa distinguishes satire from rebuking vice – a “cheerful criticism” forerunner of the ironic humour which was to become a trademark of Portuguese literature in the second half of the nineteenth century. Targeting those who deviate from the social norm (for example social climbers and older women who marry young men) or the followers of fashion (sometimes specifically “French fashion”), O Espreitador charges at liberal and progressive ideas. It ridicules the ways of the “New World” in order to perpetuate an idealized version of the “Old World”. Notwithstanding two exceptions – it condemns racism and bullfighting –, the humour of O Espreitador is conservative and conformist from a social and political standpoint.

Spiteful Strategies. The ontogeny and the practice of spite in human interaction: an experimental game theory approach and empirical applications

As estratégias de malevolência implicam que um indivíduo pague um custo para infligir um custo superior a um oponente. Como um dos comportamentos fundamentais da sociobiologia, a malevolência tem recebido menos atenção que os seus pares o egoísmo e a cooperação. Contudo, foi estabelecido que a malevolência é uma estratégia viável em populações pequenas quando usada contra indivíduos negativamente geneticamente relacionados pois este comportamento pode i) ser eliminado naturalmente, ou ii) manter-se em equilíbrio com estratégias cooperativas devido à disponibilidade da parte de indivíduos malevolentes de pagar um custo para punir. Esta tese propõe compreender se a propensão para a malevolência nos humanos é inerente ou se esta se desenvolve com a idade. Para esse efeito, considerei duas experiências de teoria de jogos em crianças em ambiente escolar com idades entre os 6 e os 22 anos. A primeira, um jogo 2x2 foi testada com duas variantes: 1) um prémio foi atribuído a ambos os jogadores, proporcionalmente aos pontos acumulados; 2), um prémio foi atribuído ao jogador com mais pontos. O jogo foi desenhado com o intuito de causar o seguinte dilema a cada jogador: i) maximizar o seu ganho e arriscar ter menos pontos que o adversário; ou ii) decidir não maximizar o seu ganho, garantindo que este não era inferior ao do seu adversário. A segunda experiência consistia num jogo do ditador com duas opções: uma escolha egoísta/altruísta (A), onde o ditador recebia mais ganho, mas o seu recipiente recebia mais que ele e uma escolha malevolente (B) que oferecia menos ganhos ao ditador que a A mas mais ganhos que o recipiente. O dilema era que se as crianças se comportassem de maneira egoísta, obtinham mais ganho para si, ao mesmo tempo que aumentavam o ganho do seu colega. Se fossem malevolentes, então prefeririam ter mais ganho que o seu colega ao mesmo tempo que tinham menos para eles próprios. As experiências foram efetuadas em escolas de duas áreas distintas de Portugal (continente e Açores) para perceber se as preferências malevolentes aumentavam ou diminuíam com a idade. Os resultados na primeira experiência sugerem que (1) os alunos compreenderam a primeira variante como um jogo de coordenação e comportaram-se como maximizadores, copiando as jogadas anteriores dos seus adversários; (2) que os alunos repetentes se comportaram preferencialmente como malevolentes, mais frequentemente que como maximizadores, com especial ênfase para os alunos de 14 anos; (3) maioria dos alunos comportou-se reciprocamente desde os 12 até aos 16 anos de idade, após os quais começaram a desenvolver uma maior tolerância às escolhas dos seus parceiros. Os resultados da segunda experiência sugerem que (1) as estratégias egoístas eram prevalentes até aos 6 anos de idade, (2) as tendências altruístas emergiram até aos 8 anos de idade e (3) as estratégias de malevolência começaram a emergir a partir dos 8 anos de idade. Estes resultados complementam a literatura relativamente escassa sobre malevolência e sugerem que este comportamento está intimamente ligado a preferências de consideração sobre os outros, o paroquialismo e os estágios de desenvolvimento das crianças.************************************************************Spite is defined as an act that causes loss of payoff to an opponent at a cost to the actor. As one of the four fundamental behaviours in sociobiology, it has received far less attention than its counterparts selfishness and cooperation. It has however been established as a viable strategy in small populations when used against negatively related individuals. Because of this, spite can either i) disappear or ii) remain at equilibrium with cooperative strategies due to the willingness of spiteful individuals to pay a cost in order to punish. This thesis sets out to understand whether propensity for spiteful behaviour is inherent or if it develops with age. For that effect, two game-theoretical experiments were performed with schoolboys and schoolgirls aged 6 to 22. The first, a 2 x 2 game, was tested in two variants: 1) a prize was awarded to both players, proportional to accumulated points; 2), a prize was given to the player with most points. Each player faced the following dilemma: i) to maximise pay-off risking a lower pay-off than the opponent; or ii) not to maximise pay-off in order to cut down the opponent below their own. The second game was a dictator experiment with two choices, (A) a selfish/altruistic choice affording more payoff to the donor than B, but more to the recipient than to the donor, and (B) a spiteful choice that afforded less payoff to the donor than A, but even lower payoff to the recipient. The dilemma here was that if subjects behaved selfishly, they obtained more payoff for themselves, while at the same time increasing their opponent payoff. If they were spiteful, they would rather have more payoff than their colleague, at the cost of less for themselves. Experiments were run in schools in two different areas in Portugal (mainland and Azores) to understand whether spiteful preferences varied with age. Results in the first experiment suggested that (1) students understood the first variant as a coordination game and engaged in maximising behaviour by copying their opponent’s plays; (2) repeating students preferentially engaged in spiteful behaviour more often than maximising behaviour, with special emphasis on 14 year-olds; (3) most students engaged in reciprocal behaviour from ages 12 to 16, as they began developing higher tolerance for their opponent choices. Results for the second experiment suggested that (1) selfish strategies were prevalent until the age of 6, (2) altruistic tendencies emerged since then, and (3) spiteful strategies began being chosen more often by 8 year-olds. These results add to the relatively scarce body of literature on spite and suggest that this type of behaviour is closely tied with other-regarding preferences, parochialism and the children’s stages of development.

Process virtualization theory (PVT) and institutional theory (INT) to explain SAAS adoption

Software as a service (SaaS) is a service model in which the applications are accessible from various client devices through internet. Several studies report possible factors driving the adoption of SaaS but none have considered the perception of the SaaS features and the pressures existing in the organization’s environment. We propose an integrated research model that combines the process virtualization theory (PVT) and the institutional theory (INT). PVT seeks to explain whether SaaS processes are suitable for migration into virtual environments via an information technology-based mechanism. INT seeks to explain the effects of the institutionalized environment on the structure and actions of the organization. The research makes three contributions. First, it addresses a gap in the SaaS adoption literature by studying the internal perception of the technical features of SaaS and external coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures faced by an organization. Second, it empirically tests many of the propositions of PVT and INT in the SaaS context, thereby helping to determine how the theory operates in practice. Third, the integration of PVT and INT contributes to the information system (IS) discipline, deepening the applicability and strengths of these theories.

EDP inovcity pilot study proposal: A set-top box interface

In this work I propose an additional test to be implemented in EDP’s residential electricity use feedback trials, under InovCity’s project scope. The proposed product to be tested consists of an interface between the smart meter and the television, through a set-top box. I provide a theoretical framework of the importance of feedback, an analysis of results from past studies involving smart metering, and a detailed description of my proposal. The results of a self-developed questionnaire related to the proposal and segmentation issues are also analyzed. Finally, general conclusions are drawn and potential future improvements and challenges are presented.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

A systematic methodology to analyse the performance and design configurations of business interoperability in cooperative industrial networks

This thesis proposes a methodology for modelling business interoperability in a context of cooperative industrial networks. The purpose is to develop a methodology that enables the design of cooperative industrial network platforms that are able to deliver business interoperability and the analysis of its impact on the performance of these platforms. To achieve the proposed objective, two modelling tools have been employed: the Axiomatic Design Theory for the design of interoperable platforms; and Agent-Based Simulation for the analysis of the impact of business interoperability. The sequence of the application of the two modelling tools depends on the scenario under analysis, i.e. whether the cooperative industrial network platform exists or not. If the cooperative industrial network platform does not exist, the methodology suggests first the application of the Axiomatic Design Theory to design different configurations of interoperable cooperative industrial network platforms, and then the use of Agent-Based Simulation to analyse or predict the business interoperability and operational performance of the designed configurations. Otherwise, one should start by analysing the performance of the existing platform and based on the achieved results, decide whether it is necessary to redesign it or not. If the redesign is needed, simulation is once again used to predict the performance of the redesigned platform. To explain how those two modelling tools can be applied in practice, a theoretical modelling framework, a theoretical Axiomatic Design model and a theoretical Agent-Based Simulation model are proposed. To demonstrate the applicability of the proposed methodology and/or to validate the proposed theoretical models, a case study regarding a Portuguese Reverse Logistics cooperative network (Valorpneu network) and a case study regarding a Portuguese construction project (Dam Baixo Sabor network) are presented. The findings of the application of the proposed methodology to these two case studies suggest that indeed the Axiomatic Design Theory can effectively contribute in the design of interoperable cooperative industrial network platforms and that Agent-Based Simulation provides an effective set of tools for analysing the impact of business interoperability on the performance of those platforms. However, these conclusions cannot be generalised as only two case studies have been carried out. In terms of relevance to theory, this is the first time that the network effect is addressed in the analysis of the impact of business interoperability on the performance of networked companies and also the first time that a holistic approach is proposed to design interoperable cooperative industrial network platforms. Regarding the practical implications, the proposed methodology is intended to provide industrial managers a management tool that can guide them easily, and in practical and systematic way, in the design of configurations of interoperable cooperative industrial network platforms and/or in the analysis of the impact of business interoperability on the performance of their companies and the networks where their companies operate.

How aspiring filmmakers cope with unexpected events on set

Making the transition between plans and unexpected occurrences is something organizations are used to doing every day. However, not much is known about how actors cope with unanticipated events and how they accommodate them within predefined schedules. In this study, we draw on an inductive analysis of aspiring filmmakers’ film sets to elaborate on how they plan their shooting activities every day, only to adjust them when unforeseen complications arise. We discover that film crews anchor their expectations for the day based on a planned shooting schedule, yet they incorporate a built-in assumption that it will inevitably be disrupted. We argue that they resort to triage processes and “troubleshooting protocols” that help decipher incoming problems. Familiar problems are solved by making use of experience obtained from past situations, whereas unprecedented problems are solved through a tacit protocol used as a tool to quickly devise an appropriate game plan. This study contributes to the literature on sense-making and provides valuable information about the unexplored world of filmmaking.

Regret associated with past and future messes under a maximizing mind-set

Promotions can make you happy if you get the “best” deal or miserable if you miss it. Previous research on this topic has shown that people favor products associated with a past miss to products associated with a future miss, and people in a maximizing mind-set, i.e. people who search for the best in different domains, feel more regret in a consumption domain. This research confirms that consumers prefer purchasing a product associated with a past miss (Experiments 1 and 2) and that regret levels are higher when participants come across the future miss, under the maximizing mind-set (Experiment 2). These studies add to the notion that information on regret might prompt people to make decisions towards a more optimistic outcome.