Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

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The implications of mandatory low-cost fuel provision

This work studies fuel retail firms’ strategic behavior in a two-dimensional product differentiation framework. Following the mandatory provision of “low-cost” fuel we consider that capacity constraints force firms to eliminate of one the previously offered qualities. Firms play a two-stage game choosing fuel qualities from three possibilities (low-cost, medium quality and high quality fuel) and then prices having exogenous opposite locations. In the highest level of consumers’ heterogeneity, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists in which firms both choose minimum quality differentiation. Consumers’ are worse off if no differentiation occurs in medium and high qualities. The effect over prices from the mandatory “low-cost” fuel law is ambiguous.

Scaling In-Memory databases on multicores

Current computer systems have evolved from featuring only a single processing unit and limited RAM, in the order of kilobytes or few megabytes, to include several multicore processors, o↵ering in the order of several tens of concurrent execution contexts, and have main memory in the order of several tens to hundreds of gigabytes. This allows to keep all data of many applications in the main memory, leading to the development of inmemory databases. Compared to disk-backed databases, in-memory databases (IMDBs) are expected to provide better performance by incurring in less I/O overhead. In this dissertation, we present a scalability study of two general purpose IMDBs on multicore systems. The results show that current general purpose IMDBs do not scale on multicores, due to contention among threads running concurrent transactions. In this work, we explore di↵erent direction to overcome the scalability issues of IMDBs in multicores, while enforcing strong isolation semantics. First, we present a solution that requires no modification to either database systems or to the applications, called MacroDB. MacroDB replicates the database among several engines, using a master-slave replication scheme, where update transactions execute on the master, while read-only transactions execute on slaves. This reduces contention, allowing MacroDB to o↵er scalable performance under read-only workloads, while updateintensive workloads su↵er from performance loss, when compared to the standalone engine. Second, we delve into the database engine and identify the concurrency control mechanism used by the storage sub-component as a scalability bottleneck. We then propose a new locking scheme that allows the removal of such mechanisms from the storage sub-component. This modification o↵ers performance improvement under all workloads, when compared to the standalone engine, while scalability is limited to read-only workloads. Next we addressed the scalability limitations for update-intensive workloads, and propose the reduction of locking granularity from the table level to the attribute level. This further improved performance for intensive and moderate update workloads, at a slight cost for read-only workloads. Scalability is limited to intensive-read and read-only workloads. Finally, we investigate the impact applications have on the performance of database systems, by studying how operation order inside transactions influences the database performance. We then propose a Read before Write (RbW) interaction pattern, under which transaction perform all read operations before executing write operations. The RbW pattern allowed TPC-C to achieve scalable performance on our modified engine for all workloads. Additionally, the RbW pattern allowed our modified engine to achieve scalable performance on multicores, almost up to the total number of cores, while enforcing strong isolation.