52 resultados para global games


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O Tema da Festa tem uma enorme importância comunicacional para o sector social do associativismo e voluntariado. É na Festa e pela Festa que se afirmam muitos dos valores simbólicos e factores materiais que condicionam a vida das organizações; Estado, empresas e associativismo. Desde logo convém recordar que uma percentagem muito significativa das populações dos países mais desenvolvidos investem uma parte importante do seu tempo e dinheiro nas Organizações Não Govemamentais (ONGs ) por várias razões. Como forma de celebrar e glorificar certas entidades colectivas, certas datas, certos rituais. As Grandes Festas Religiosas sempre foram formas de Celebrar e Glorificar momentos importantes da vida colectiva. No Natal e na Páscoa por exemplo, milhões de pessoas por todo o Mundo e centenas de milhares de organizações celebram estas Festas com um grande investimento simbólico e material na solidariedade humana e no Amor ao Próximo. Neste aspecto podemos interrogar-nos; constituem estas e outras grandes Festas momentos de Relações Públicas para pessoas e organizações ou verdadeiros momentos de transformação social e espiritual? Todas as Grandes Religiões prometeram e prometem uma Nova Civilização plena de Amor e de Harmonia que seria o contraponto do Antigo e Actual mundo materialista impregnado de ódio, violência e desejos materialistas.

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Geospatial Technologies.

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Energia e Bioenergia

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Informática

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We introduce a notion of upper semicontinuity, weak upper semicontinuity, and show that it, together with a weak form of payoff security, is enough to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria in compact, quasiconcave normal form games. We show that our result generalizes the pure strategy existence theorem of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and that it is neither implied nor does it imply the existence theorems of Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993) and Reny (1999). Furthermore, we show that an equilibrium may fail to exist when, while maintaining weak payoff security, weak upper semicontinuity is weakened to reciprocal upper semicontinuity.

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Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983), Mas-Colell (1984), Khan and Sun (1999) and Podczeck (2007a). The level of generality of each of these existence results is typically regarded as a criterion to evaluate how appropriate is the corresponding formalization of large games. In contrast, we argue that such evaluation is pointless. In fact, we show that, in a precise sense, all the above existence results are equivalent. Thus, all of them are equally strong and therefore cannot rank the different formalizations of large games.

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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This paper extends the standard industrial organization models of repeated interaction between firms by incorporating preferences for reciprocity. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (destructive reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (constructive reciprocity). The main finding of the paper is that, for plausible perceptions of fairness, preferences for reciprocity facilitate collusion in infinitely repeated market games, that is, the critical discount rate at wish collusion can be sustained tends to be lower when firms have preferences for reciprocity than when firms are selfish. The paper also finds that the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with reciprocal firms is worse for consumers than the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with selfish firms.