The determinants of net interest margins & net interest spreads in the Russian & Japanese Commercial Banking sectors

This study presents an empirical investigation of the determinants of net interest margins and spreads in the Russian and Japanese banking sectors with a particular focus on commercial banks. Net interest mar-gins and spreads serve as indicators of financial intermediation efficiency. This paper employed a bank-level unbalanced panel dataset prolonging from 2005 to 2014. My main empirical results show that bank characteristics explain the most of the variation in not only net interest margins but also in spreads. Capi-talization, liquidity risk, inflation, economic growth, private and government debt are important determi-nants of margin in Russia. In Japan to the contrary loan and deposit market concentration along with bank size do predominate. Common significant variables in both countries are the substitution effect, cost effi-ciency and profitability. Turning to net interest spreads, micro- and macro-specific variables are the main significant drivers in Russia. I reach the conclusion that there are no significant determinants of net interest spreads in Japan within the original selection of variables, but operating efficiency and deposits to total funding seem to prevail. In both countries, there are solid differences in the net interest margins as well as spreads once the pre- and the post-crisis periods are considered.

Improving retail banking staff incentive systems

This Work Project seeks to analyze the viability, utility and best way of implementing mechanisms of double accounting and of insertion of low (or null) sales objectives in an incentives program. The main findings are that both processes are possible and to a certain extent advisable, although in very specific ways and with some limitations. Double accounting processes are especially effective between different segments and networks and should have a greater impact in the first evaluation periods of each case and the null objectives, albeit usable, are recommended to be always substituted by positive objectives, even if quite small. Moreover, it is concluded that the formal structure of the incentives program influences significantly these concepts, namely concerning the duration of the evaluation periods and the interaction of the objectives of different entities for both the vertical (hierarchic) and horizontal (individual and collective) levels.