40 resultados para Computer games -- Programming
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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Informática
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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Informática
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Os primeiros trabalhos sobre Computer-Supported Cooperative Work surgiram na segunda metade da década de 80, estabelecendo-se um campo de investigação interdisciplinar com enfoque no papel do computador e das tecnologias da comunicação no apoio do trabalho em grupo (Ishii et al., 1994). Ao abordar esta área de investigação torna-se claro que é necessário ter em conta a diversidade dos grupos e das tarefas que estes devem de utilizar, entre outros factores importantes. As implicações desta diversidade são discutidas ao nível concepção de interfaces de groupware, em que um maior envolvimento dos utilizadores nas fases iniciais parece ser necessário, e ao nível dos Sistemas de Apoio à Decisão em Grupo.
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work presented in the context of the European Master’s program in Computational Logic, as the partial requirement for obtaining Master of Science degree in Computational Logic
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Based on the report for the “Project III” unit of the PhD programme on Technology Assessment under the supervision of Prof. António B. Moniz. This report was discussed also at the 2nd Winter School on Technology Assessment held at Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Caparica Campus, Portugal on December 2011.
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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Geospatial Technologies.
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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Doutor em Informática
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Based on the report for “Project IV” unit of the PhD programme on Technology Assessment (Doctoral Conference) at Universidade Nova de Lisboa (December 2011). This thesis research has the supervision of António Moniz (FCT-UNL and ITAS-KIT) and Armin Grunwald (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology-ITAS, Germany). Other members of the thesis committee are Mário Forjaz Secca (FCT-UNL) and Femke Nijboer (University of Twente, Netherlands).
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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Informática
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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Doutor em Informática
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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Biotecnologia
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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Informática
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We introduce a notion of upper semicontinuity, weak upper semicontinuity, and show that it, together with a weak form of payoff security, is enough to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria in compact, quasiconcave normal form games. We show that our result generalizes the pure strategy existence theorem of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and that it is neither implied nor does it imply the existence theorems of Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993) and Reny (1999). Furthermore, we show that an equilibrium may fail to exist when, while maintaining weak payoff security, weak upper semicontinuity is weakened to reciprocal upper semicontinuity.
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Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983), Mas-Colell (1984), Khan and Sun (1999) and Podczeck (2007a). The level of generality of each of these existence results is typically regarded as a criterion to evaluate how appropriate is the corresponding formalization of large games. In contrast, we argue that such evaluation is pointless. In fact, we show that, in a precise sense, all the above existence results are equivalent. Thus, all of them are equally strong and therefore cannot rank the different formalizations of large games.
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This paper extends the standard industrial organization models of repeated interaction between firms by incorporating preferences for reciprocity. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (destructive reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (constructive reciprocity). The main finding of the paper is that, for plausible perceptions of fairness, preferences for reciprocity facilitate collusion in infinitely repeated market games, that is, the critical discount rate at wish collusion can be sustained tends to be lower when firms have preferences for reciprocity than when firms are selfish. The paper also finds that the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with reciprocal firms is worse for consumers than the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with selfish firms.