The institutions of archaic post-modernity and their organizational and managerial consequences: The case of Portugal

The long march of modernization of the Western societies tends to be presented as following a regular sequence: societies and institutions were pre-modern, and then they were modernized, eventually becoming post-modern. Such teleology may provide an incomplete or distorted narrative of societal evolution in many parts of the world, even in the ‘post-modern heartland’ of Western Europe, with Portugal being a case in point. The concept of archaic post-modernity has been developed by a philosopher, José Gil, to show how Portuguese institutions and organizations combine elements of pre-modernity and post-modernity. The notion of an archaic post-modernity is advanced in order to provide an alternative account of the modernization process, which enriches discussion of the varieties of capitalism. Differences in historical experiences create singularities that may be considered in the analysis of culture, management and organization.

Growth Accounting: How institutions affect Portugal's Growth

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Spatial Patterns and Irregularities of the electoral data: general elections in Canada

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Geospatial Technologies.

Reciprocity, inequity aversion, and oligopolistic competition

This paper studies how reciprocity and inequity aversion influence the behavior of firms in imperfectly competitive markets. The paper shows that if reciprocal firms compete à la Cournot, then they are able to sustain “collusive” outcomes under a positive reciprocity equilibrium. By contrast, Stackelberg warfare outcomes may emerge under a negative reciprocity equilibrium. The results for inequity aversion are similar. Cournot competition between inequity averse firms can be harmful to consumers if it leads to equilibria where firms feel compassion toward each other. However, in equilibria where inequity averse firms are envious of each other consumers are better off than if firms were selfish. The paper also shows that only under very restrictive conditions does reciprocity or inequity aversion have an impact on Bertrand competition. Finally, the paper shows that non-selfish preferences have a greater impact on equilibrium outcomes in markets with a small number of firms.

Credit risk of financial institutions

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Electoral opportunism and fiscal policy before and after the EMU

A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Macroeconomic impacts of politics and policy: Applications to financial and real markets

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

The Portuguese Administrative Elite, 1851-1910

The aim of this article is to examine the composition and patterns of recruitment of the ministries’directors-general, as well as to assess the interconnections between bureaucracy and politics, from the beginnings of Regeneração (1851) until the breakdown of Monarchy (1910). The post of director-general was considered one of “political trust”, that might be filled by individuals from outside the civil service, and the selection and de-selection of officeholders depended exclusively on the ministers’ will. Nonetheless, most directors-general were experienced bureaucrats, boasting a steady career as civil servants, and remained in office for long terms, regardless of ministerial discontinuities. In other words, High Administration became relatively immune to party-driven politics. Due to their professional background and lengthy tenure, directors-general were usually highly skilled specialists, combining technical expertise and practical knowledge of the wheels of state bureaucracy. Hence, they were often influential actors in policy-making, playing an active (and sometimes decisive) part behind the scenes, in both designing and implementing government policies. As regards their social profile, directors-general formed a cohesive and homogeneous elite group: being predominantly drawn from urban middle class milieus, highly educated, and appointed to office in their forties.

The patent expiry as a major inflection point in a branded Rx drug's life and strategies to counter generic competition - exemplified at Pfizer's blockbuster drug Lipitor in the USA

A large number of expensive, but highly profitable branded prescription drugs will go off-patent in the USA between 2011 and 2015. Their revenues are crucial to fund the immense costs associated with the development of an innovative drug. The rising cost pressure on pharmaceutical stakeholders has increased the demand for more affordable medications, as provided by the branded drug's generic counterpart. Yet, research based incumbents are moving beyond the traditional late lifecycle strategies and deploy more aggressive tactics in order to protect their brands, as seen with Pfizer's Lipitor!. It is doubtful, whether these efforts will help the blockbuster business model to resist current market conditions.

Shiva's dance: Crisis, local institutions and private firms

The uneven spatial distribution of start-ups and their respective survival may reflect comparative advantages resulting from the local institutional background. For the first time, we explore this idea using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to assess the relative efficiency of Portuguese municipalities in this specific context. We depart from the related literature where expenditure is perceived as a desirable input by choosing a measure of fiscal responsibility and infrastructural variables in the first stage. Comparing results for 2006 and 2010, we find that mean performance decreased substantially 1) with the effects of the Global Financial Crisis, 2) as municipal population increases and 3) as financial independence decreases. A second stage is then performed employing a double-bootstrap procedure to evaluate how the regional context outside the control of local authorities (e.g. demographic characteristics and political preferences) impacts on efficiency.

Systemic risk for financial institutions in UK

Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) is an approach used to measure the systemic risk financial institutions face. It estimates how significantly systemic events (poor market performance, out of 1.6 times Standard Deviation borders) are expected to affect market capitalization of a particular firm. The concept was developed in the late 2000s and is widely used for cross-country comparisons of financial firms. For the purposes of generalization of this technique it is often used with market data containing non-domestic currencies for some financial firms. That may lead to results having currency noise in them as it is shown for 77 UK financial firms in our analysis between 2001 and 2014.

Portuguese commercial banking: An assessment of competition in the 1960-2013 period

Strong consolidation is one of the most evident developments of banking markets around the world in recent decades. This change is raising questions on how and to what an extent competition is affected by the expansion of the largest banks. The aim of the present study is to measure the degree of competition in the Portuguese commercial banking market in the long-run, during the period ranging from1960 to 2013, by using the non-structural model developed by Panzar and Rosse. The main findings are that the Portuguese banking system, despite the legal restrictions in place, operated mostly in a market with some degree of competition and, at some points in time, presented some interesting competitive features. More recently, it has evolved into functioning as a cartel.

Competition effects from patient mobility in the European Union

This paper studies the effects of reimbursement for medical tourism within the European Union. We use a spatial competition framework to study the effects on prices, qualities and patient flows between two countries. Patient mobility increases with the implementation of reimbursement mechanisms. The resulting equilibria in prices and qualities depend on the rule of reimbursements and possible differences in country specific parameters. Soft budget constraints that public providers may have, pose a competitive advantage over private providers and divert demand toward the former. Supranational coordination concerning soft budgets constraints is needed to address the potentially detrimental effects on aggregate welfar

Competition policy costs to firms

The existence of competition policy forces companies to adjust their behaviour. This is also costly. Using a database from a company on contracts, I will try to estimate if a specific competition policy disposition, supply contracts cannot be longer than 60 months, has costs for the coffee suppliers operating in the Portuguese “on-trade” coffee market. The estimation method used in this paper will be OLS. The results suggest that limiting the duration of exclusivity contracts to 60 months can be harmful to the coffee suppliers and it can even seriously affect the market functioning. Key