O Ne bis in idem no Espaço de Liberdade, Segurança e Justiça e no Direito Europeu da Concorrência

Ne bis in idem, understood as a procedural guarantee in the EU assumes different features in the AFSJ and in european competition law. Despite having a common origin (being, in both sectors the result of the case law of the same jurisdictional organ) its components are quite distintic in each area of the integration. In the AFSJ, the content of bis and idem are broader and addressed at a larger protection of individuals. Its axiological ground is based on the freedom of movements and human dignity, whereas in european competition law its closely linked to defence rights of legal persons and the concept of criminal punishment of anticompetitive sanctions as interpreted by the ECHR´s jurisprudence. In european competition law, ne bis in idem is limited by the systemic framework of competition law and the need to ensure parallel application of both european and national laws. Nonetheless, the absence of a compulsory mechanism to allocate jurisdiction in the EU (both in the AFSJ and in the field of anti-trust law) demands a common axiological framework. In this context, ne bis in idem must be understood as a defence right based on equity and proportionality. As far as its international dimension is concerned, ne bis in idem also lacks an erga omnes effect and it is not considered to be a rule of ius cogens. Consequently, the model which the ECJ has built regarding the application of the ne bis in idem in transnational and supranational contexts should be replicated by other courts through cross fertilization, in order to internationalize that procedural guarantee and broaden its scope of application.

O abuso de informação privilegiada (insider trading)

In the stock market, information takes on special relevance, due to the market’s permanent updating and the great fluidity of information existent therein. Just as in any other negotiations, the party with the better information has a bargaining advantage, as it is able to make more advantageous business decisions. However, unlike most other markets, the proper functioning of the stock market is greatly dependent on investors’ trust in the market itself. As such, if there are investors who, due to any condition they possess or office they hold, have access to relevant information which is not accessible to the general public, distrust is bred within the market and, consequently, investment is lessened. Thus, there is a need to prevent those who hold privileged information from using it in abusive ways. In Portugal, abuse of privileged information is set out and punished criminally in Article 378. of the Portuguese Securities Code (‘Código dos Valores Mobiliários’). In this dissertation, I have set out, firstly, to analyze the inherent conditions for there to be a crime of abuse of privileged information; secondly, to analyze two well-known cases, which took place and were decided in other jurisdictions, and attempt to understand how these cases would fall under Article 378. of the Portuguese Securities Code. Whereas the first case, Chiarella v. United States, was scrutinize under Article 378 of the Portuguese Securities Code, in the second, Lafonta v. AMF, the conclusion arrived at was that the crime taken place was different. This analysis allowed, on one hand, the application to a particular case of prerequisites and concepts which were explained, at a first approach, from a more theoretical perspective; on the other hand, it also allowed the further development of specific aspects of the regime, namely the difference between an insider and a tipee, as well as to more clearly set out the limits to the precise character of the information at hand.