Disposição para pagar uma intervenção para melhorar o controlo da hipertensão em hipertensos não controlados : um estudo-piloto

RESUMO - A valorização económica de intervenções preventivas pode contribuir para melhorar a afetação de recursos em saúde. A hipertensão, primeira causa de morte em Portugal, é um grave problema de saúde Pública e o principal fator de risco para a ocorrência de Acidente Vascular Cerebral (AVC). O presente estudo é um primeiro ensaio para quantificar a disposição para pagar (DPP) da sociedade por uma intervenção de promoção da adesão à terapêutica em hipertensos não controlados. Foi aplicado um questionário presencial a uma amostra de conveniência (n=93), numa perspetiva ex post, sendo o questionário constituído por dois formatos de questões e dois cenários de diferentes reduções de pressão arterial sistólica (cenário 1 corresponde à redução de 10 mmHg e cenário 2 à redução de 20 mmHg). O risco de AVC a 10 anos foi adaptado à idade e ao sexo de cada participante. Relativamente ao cenário 1, a DPP média foi de €25,87 e €33,93, dependendo do formato da questão (resposta aberta ou bidding game, respetivamente). Na questão de resposta aberta, 78,3% dos participantes estavam dispostos para pagar pela intervenção, no bidding game 75,6% dos participantes referiram estar dispostos para pagar pelo menos €10. No cenário 2, a DPP média foi de €26,81 e €34,79, dependendo se o formato da questão era do tipo resposta aberta ou bidding game, respetivamente. Na questão de resposta aberta, 84,3% dos participantes estavam dispostos para pagar pela intervenção, no bidding game 76,1% dos participantes referiram estar dispostos para pagar pelo menos €10. Ao contrário do bidding game, nas questões de resposta aberta verificou-se 25,8% e 24,7% de respostas “não sei”, para o cenário 1 e cenário 2 respetivamente, diretamente relacionada com a baixa escolaridade dos participantes (p=0,004). Também se verificou uma maior tendência para respostas às questões de bidding game com valores mais elevados, comparativamente às questões de resposta aberta. Identificaram-se duas variáveis explicativas para os valores DPP: o rendimento e a ocupação principal. A sensibilidade dos respondentes à magnitude dos ganhos em saúde foi verificada internamente em cada questionário (os participantes referiram DPP mais elevadas no cenário 2 relativamente ao cenário 1), no entanto, os participantes que beneficiariam mais da intervenção não demonstraram DPP superiores aos restantes. Para confirmar os efeitos identificados neste estudo e extrapolá-los para a população portuguesa é necessário realizar um estudo representativo de população portuguesa.

Environmental sustainability adoption

Double degree

The role of guarantees in pension plan design: Pension saving decisions

This study centers on the assessment of psychological value of guarantees in pension products and the behavior biases associated with choice. When a guarantee on a product increases from 99% to 99,5% less than half of respondents show willingness to pay in contrast with 73% when going from 99,5% to 100%. Out of 105 respondents, 55 show that their choices concerning pension products are inconsistent with classic utility theory. Financial background proves insignificant thus pointing to behavioral biases. As individuals make choices that leave them worse-off, we argue that pension plan design would highly benefit from public policy interventions.

Spiteful Strategies. The ontogeny and the practice of spite in human interaction: an experimental game theory approach and empirical applications

As estratégias de malevolência implicam que um indivíduo pague um custo para infligir um custo superior a um oponente. Como um dos comportamentos fundamentais da sociobiologia, a malevolência tem recebido menos atenção que os seus pares o egoísmo e a cooperação. Contudo, foi estabelecido que a malevolência é uma estratégia viável em populações pequenas quando usada contra indivíduos negativamente geneticamente relacionados pois este comportamento pode i) ser eliminado naturalmente, ou ii) manter-se em equilíbrio com estratégias cooperativas devido à disponibilidade da parte de indivíduos malevolentes de pagar um custo para punir. Esta tese propõe compreender se a propensão para a malevolência nos humanos é inerente ou se esta se desenvolve com a idade. Para esse efeito, considerei duas experiências de teoria de jogos em crianças em ambiente escolar com idades entre os 6 e os 22 anos. A primeira, um jogo 2x2 foi testada com duas variantes: 1) um prémio foi atribuído a ambos os jogadores, proporcionalmente aos pontos acumulados; 2), um prémio foi atribuído ao jogador com mais pontos. O jogo foi desenhado com o intuito de causar o seguinte dilema a cada jogador: i) maximizar o seu ganho e arriscar ter menos pontos que o adversário; ou ii) decidir não maximizar o seu ganho, garantindo que este não era inferior ao do seu adversário. A segunda experiência consistia num jogo do ditador com duas opções: uma escolha egoísta/altruísta (A), onde o ditador recebia mais ganho, mas o seu recipiente recebia mais que ele e uma escolha malevolente (B) que oferecia menos ganhos ao ditador que a A mas mais ganhos que o recipiente. O dilema era que se as crianças se comportassem de maneira egoísta, obtinham mais ganho para si, ao mesmo tempo que aumentavam o ganho do seu colega. Se fossem malevolentes, então prefeririam ter mais ganho que o seu colega ao mesmo tempo que tinham menos para eles próprios. As experiências foram efetuadas em escolas de duas áreas distintas de Portugal (continente e Açores) para perceber se as preferências malevolentes aumentavam ou diminuíam com a idade. Os resultados na primeira experiência sugerem que (1) os alunos compreenderam a primeira variante como um jogo de coordenação e comportaram-se como maximizadores, copiando as jogadas anteriores dos seus adversários; (2) que os alunos repetentes se comportaram preferencialmente como malevolentes, mais frequentemente que como maximizadores, com especial ênfase para os alunos de 14 anos; (3) maioria dos alunos comportou-se reciprocamente desde os 12 até aos 16 anos de idade, após os quais começaram a desenvolver uma maior tolerância às escolhas dos seus parceiros. Os resultados da segunda experiência sugerem que (1) as estratégias egoístas eram prevalentes até aos 6 anos de idade, (2) as tendências altruístas emergiram até aos 8 anos de idade e (3) as estratégias de malevolência começaram a emergir a partir dos 8 anos de idade. Estes resultados complementam a literatura relativamente escassa sobre malevolência e sugerem que este comportamento está intimamente ligado a preferências de consideração sobre os outros, o paroquialismo e os estágios de desenvolvimento das crianças.************************************************************Spite is defined as an act that causes loss of payoff to an opponent at a cost to the actor. As one of the four fundamental behaviours in sociobiology, it has received far less attention than its counterparts selfishness and cooperation. It has however been established as a viable strategy in small populations when used against negatively related individuals. Because of this, spite can either i) disappear or ii) remain at equilibrium with cooperative strategies due to the willingness of spiteful individuals to pay a cost in order to punish. This thesis sets out to understand whether propensity for spiteful behaviour is inherent or if it develops with age. For that effect, two game-theoretical experiments were performed with schoolboys and schoolgirls aged 6 to 22. The first, a 2 x 2 game, was tested in two variants: 1) a prize was awarded to both players, proportional to accumulated points; 2), a prize was given to the player with most points. Each player faced the following dilemma: i) to maximise pay-off risking a lower pay-off than the opponent; or ii) not to maximise pay-off in order to cut down the opponent below their own. The second game was a dictator experiment with two choices, (A) a selfish/altruistic choice affording more payoff to the donor than B, but more to the recipient than to the donor, and (B) a spiteful choice that afforded less payoff to the donor than A, but even lower payoff to the recipient. The dilemma here was that if subjects behaved selfishly, they obtained more payoff for themselves, while at the same time increasing their opponent payoff. If they were spiteful, they would rather have more payoff than their colleague, at the cost of less for themselves. Experiments were run in schools in two different areas in Portugal (mainland and Azores) to understand whether spiteful preferences varied with age. Results in the first experiment suggested that (1) students understood the first variant as a coordination game and engaged in maximising behaviour by copying their opponent’s plays; (2) repeating students preferentially engaged in spiteful behaviour more often than maximising behaviour, with special emphasis on 14 year-olds; (3) most students engaged in reciprocal behaviour from ages 12 to 16, as they began developing higher tolerance for their opponent choices. Results for the second experiment suggested that (1) selfish strategies were prevalent until the age of 6, (2) altruistic tendencies emerged since then, and (3) spiteful strategies began being chosen more often by 8 year-olds. These results add to the relatively scarce body of literature on spite and suggest that this type of behaviour is closely tied with other-regarding preferences, parochialism and the children’s stages of development.

Internationalization venture analysis of NMusic to the Spanish market

Field lab: Entrepreneurial and innovative ventures

On international cost-sharing of pharmaceutical R&D

Ramsey pricing has been proposed in the pharmaceutical industry as a principle to price discriminate among markets while allowing to recover the (fixed) R&D cost. However, such analyses neglect the presence of insurance or the fund raising costs for most of drug reimbursement. By incorporating these new elements, we aim at providing some building blocks towards an economic theory incorporating Ramsey pricing and insurance coverage. We show how coinsurance affects the optimal prices to pay for the R&D investment. We also show that under certain conditions, there is no strategic incentive by governments to set coinsurance rates in order to shift the financial burden of R&D. This will have important implications to the application of Ramsey pricing principles to pharmaceutical products across countries.

Assessing organizations collaboration readiness: a behavioral approach

Dissertation presented at the Faculty of Sciences and Technology of the New University of Lisbon to obtain the degree of Doctor in Electrical Engineering, specialty of Robotics and Integrated Manufacturing

O contrato de Project Finance

Currently, Angola portrays a notorious economic growth and due to recent innovative legislations, it has become the major investment attracting pole, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, having, thus, an extraordinary potentiality for a rapid and sustainable development, likely to place her in outstanding positions in the world economic ranking. Yet, such economic growth entails demanding levels of intensive investment in infrastructure, what has been reported of the Angolan Government to be unable to respond to, save if recurring to very high index of external debt, poisoning, in this way, the future budgeting of the country. Due to these infrastructure investment shortages, the cost of production remains highly onerous and the cost of life extremely unaffordable. On this account, the current study disserts about the contract of Project Finance; an alternative finance resource given as a viable solution for the private financing of infrastructure, aiming to demonstrate that such contractual figure, likewise the experience of several emerging economies and others, is a contract bid framework to take into account in today’s world. It refers to a financing technique – through which the Government may satisfy a common need (for example, the construction of a public domain or public servicing), without having to pay neither offer any collateral – based on a complex legal-financial engineering, arranged throughout a coalition of typical and atypical agreements, whereby it is mandatory to look back at the basic concepts of corporate law. More than just a simple financial study, the dissertation at stake analyses the nature and legal framework of Project Finance, which is a legally atypical and innominate contract, concluding that there is a relevant need for regulating and devoting a special legal regime in the Angolan jurisdiction for this promising legal form in the contemporary corporate finance world.

A harmonização fiscal europeia

With this dissertation we aim to analyze the most relevant aspects of the excise duties harmonized regime, considering Community origins, but having also in attention all legal specifications of its implementation in Portugal. The legal regime of excise duties is presented as an ambitious theme, considering the challenge of different branches of law that influence this subject, such as Tax, Economic and Community laws, the inescapable influence of customs procedures, or regarding environmental objectives. In the European context, the harmonization of excise duties was seen as a condition for the implementation of the internal market, contributing to undo secular tax barriers between Member States and, since so, ensure fair competition and free movement of services and goods. Along with VAT, the excise duties harmonization process could represent a potential European tax system, essential for a full and integrated single market. In this context, it is essential to pay special attention to specific characteristics of excise duties regime, such as ‘duty suspension arrangement’ applicable during the production phase, storage and movement in certain conditions. The growing importance of excise duties, as for revenue or extra-fiscal purposes, recommends new academic studies on this subject, seeking new opportunities and challenges.

Potential M&A between TIM Brazil and Oi S.A: The irreversible force of Telecommunications convergence

The intrinsic forces of market aiming for telecom industry convergence has arrived to Brazil. This case presents real characters, a sequence of events and other public information that has been impacting two corporations studied in this case. TIM Brazil and Oi S.A, two top players in the Brazilian telecom industry mobile and fixed segment respectively. While a merge between the two of them looks perfect and simple in an operational perspective due to its vertical complementarity, bring to them opportunities to win over a bundle offer (multi service package) that will consolidate their market predominance. Macroeconomic and internal corporate contrasts between these companies’ environment might signal that an impulsive could have a high price to pay in the future.

Corporate social responsibility

There is general consensus nowadays that CSR is not just altruistic do-gooding but rather a way for both companies and society to prosper. Companies themselves increasingly recognize that their sustainability depends on their willingness to assume responsibility for social and environmental issues. Academic research has, in the past, tried to theorize exactly how CSR improves business, employee satisfaction and productivity. However, few studies have a) separated the different effects of internal CSR and external CSR and b) studied these effects in times of internal organizational distrust. Hence, this paper examines the relationship between each type of CSR with two outcome variables related to employee attitudes: affective organizational commitment (AOC) and turnover intentions (TI). Furthermore, it investigates whether organizational distrust works as a moderator in each of these relationships by testing the hypothesis using a sample of 212 employees from a company that is currently going through a moment of internal crisis. Findings suggest that although all variables are strongly correlated, distrust works as a moderator for external CSR but not for internal CSR. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings conclude the paper.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

Basel III: The impact of new capital requirements on profitability of Portuguese Banks

This empirical study aims to explore the impact of increased capital ratio requirements, on the ROE of the Portuguese banking sector. The paper employs both a quantitative- and qualitative approach, with the qualitative approach as the main method of research. The method adopted to conduct the qualitative research was semi structured elite interviews with banking executives. Higher capital requirements decrease the ROE of banks in Portugal, but huge impairments charges, macroeconomic factors and increased costs of deposits are clearly the dominant reasons for the reduced levels of ROE the past years. Among the measures taken to increase capital ratios, reduction of RWAs and non-core assets have been the main focus, but the issuance of CoCos is regarded as the most expensive measure due to high interest payments. However, the CoCos will not have any effect on the ROE in the long term. It is difficult to draw any conclusions on the impact of more equity in the balance sheet on the ROE of Portuguese banks, as many banks currently don’t generate enough money to pay back on shareholders´ investments.

Contratos de prestação de serviços de comunicações electrónicas

The object of this dissertation is the analysis of the legal framework applicable to contracts for provision of electronic communications services, while trying to offer solutions to some of the issues regarding this matter. The main focus of this study will be the rules concerning service’s suspension, which have been recently amended. The technological development and the establishment of these services as information transmitters and work tools were noteworthy for its growing importance at the present time. These services include cable television, telephone (landline and mobile) and internet and they are regulated by Law nr 23/96, July 26th, along with other essential public services. Said law sets a group of principles and duties, such as good faith (article 3), continuity and quality of the service (article 7) and the duty to rightfully inform the user (article 4), in order to protect the users. For the analysis of legal framework applicable to these particular contracts it is also fundamental to mention Law nr 5/2004, February 10th, known as Electronic Communications Law. The provisions regarding the service’s suspension are currently prescribed in articles 52.º and 52.º-A of the law. Given the amendments introduced by Law nr 10/2013, January 28th, consumers are subjected to a regulation different from the one applicable to the other users, established in the new article 52.º-A. From our analysis, we have concluded that the main change from past provisions has to do with the automatic termination of the contract as consequence of the consumer’s failure to pay the price or to conclude a written payment arrangement after service’s suspension.

Community indentification in peer-t-peer collaborative consumption services

Even though collaborative consumption (CC) is gaining economic importance, research in CC is still in its infancy. Consumers’ reasons for participating have already been investigated but little research on consequences of participation has been conducted. This article examines whether interactions between customers in peer-to-peer CC services influence the willingness to coproduce service outcomes. Drawing on social exchange theory, it is proposed that this effect is mediated by consumers’ identification with the brand community. Furthermore, continuance intention in CC is introduced as a second stage moderator. In a cross-sectional study, customers of peer-to-peer accommodation sharing are surveyed. While customer-to-customer interactions were found to have a positive effect on brand community identification, brand community identification did not positively affect co-production intention. Surprisingly, the effect of brand community identification on co-production intention was negative. Moreover, continuance intention of customers did not moderate this relationship. Bearing in mind current challenges for researchers and companies, theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.