Mapeamento da Responsabilidade Social em Portugal (The Mapping of Social Responsibility in Portugal)

Conferência multidisciplinar e multicultural.

Teaching and learning with social software in higher education: content management systems integrated with Web-based applications as a key factor for success

The change of paradigm imposed by the Bologna process, in which the student will be responsible for their own learning, and the presence of a new generation of students with higher technological skills, represent a huge challenge for higher education institutions. The use of new Web Social concepts in teaching process, supported by applications commonly called Web 2.0, with which these new students feel at ease, can bring benefits in terms of motivation and the frequency and quality of students' involvement in academic activities. An e-learning platform with web-based applications as a complement can significantly contribute to the development of different skills in higher education students, covering areas which are usually in deficit.

Privatization and social welfare in an international mixed Stackelberg duopoly

Competition between public and private firms exists in a range of industries like telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, airlines industries, as weel as services including hospitals, banking and education. Some authors studied mixed oligopolies under Cournot competition (firms move simultaneously) and some others considered Stackelberg models (firms move sequentially). Tomaru [1] analyzed, in a Cournot model, how decision-making upon cost-reducing R&D investment by a domestic public firm is affected by privatization when competing in the domestic market with a foreign firm. He shows that privatization of the domestic public firm lowers productive efficiency and deteriorates domestic social welfare. In this paper, we examine the same question but in a Stackelberg formulation instead of Cournot. The model is a three-stage game. In the first stage, the domestic firm chooses the amount of cost-reducing R&D investment. Then, the firms compete à la Stackelberg. Two cases are considered: (i) The domestic firm is the leader; (ii) The foreign firm is the leader. We show that the results obtained in [1] for Cournot competition are robust in the sence that they are also true when firms move sequentially.