Licensing in an international triopoly

We study the effects of entry of two foreign firms on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the incumbent is technologically superior to the entrants. We consider two different situations: (i) the cost-reducing innovation is licensed to both entrants; (ii) the cost- reducing innovation is licensed to just one of the entrants. We analyse three kind of license: (lump- sum) fixed-fee; (per-unit) royalty; and two-part tariff, that is a combination of a fixed-fee and a royalty. We prove that a two part tariff is never an optimal licensing scheme for the incumbent. Moreover, (i) when the technology is licensed to the two entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only output royalty; and (ii) when the technology is licensed to just one of the entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only a fixed-fee.

An organizational culture approach to performance in information technology micro-firms

This study aims to analyze and compare micro-firms’ organizational culture related to organizational performance. A case study methodology was used based on four firms, competitors among themselves in the Information Technology business, focusing on the years between 2008-2013. Findings pointed out many similarities to larger firms, but some specificities of micro-firms were found and propositions were defined: clan culture predominance is related to best performing micro-firms; the configuration of several culture types seemed to be the most suitable for obtaining good organizational results, provided that they do not focus only on hierarchy and market types of culture; the market culture predominance perception by employees is associated with low job satisfaction; and, after a certain time in business, micro-firms, as do larger companies, seek to standardize and control processes. Recognizing that organizational culture is considered important to firms’ results, this study sheds some light on that important factor for micro-firms.