A lightweight indoor localization model based on motley-keenan and COST

This paper presents a novel approach to WLAN propagation models for use in indoor localization. The major goal of this work is to eliminate the need for in situ data collection to generate the Fingerprinting map, instead, it is generated by using analytical propagation models such as: COST Multi-Wall, COST 231 average wall and Motley- Keenan. As Location Estimation Algorithms kNN (K-Nearest Neighbour) and WkNN (Weighted K-Nearest Neighbour) were used to determine the accuracy of the proposed technique. This work is based on analytical and measurement tools to determine which path loss propagation models are better for location estimation applications, based on Receive Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI).This study presents different proposals for choosing the most appropriate values for the models parameters, like obstacles attenuation and coefficients. Some adjustments to these models, particularly to Motley-Keenan, considering the thickness of walls, are proposed. The best found solution is based on the adjusted Motley-Keenan and COST models that allows to obtain the propagation loss estimation for several environments.Results obtained from two testing scenarios showed the reliability of the adjustments, providing smaller errors in the measured values values in comparison with the predicted values.

Licensing in an international triopoly

We study the effects of entry of two foreign firms on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the incumbent is technologically superior to the entrants. We consider two different situations: (i) the cost-reducing innovation is licensed to both entrants; (ii) the cost- reducing innovation is licensed to just one of the entrants. We analyse three kind of license: (lump- sum) fixed-fee; (per-unit) royalty; and two-part tariff, that is a combination of a fixed-fee and a royalty. We prove that a two part tariff is never an optimal licensing scheme for the incumbent. Moreover, (i) when the technology is licensed to the two entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only output royalty; and (ii) when the technology is licensed to just one of the entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only a fixed-fee.

Separating sequential equilibrium in a Bayesian international duopoly

We consider two Cournot firms, one located in the home country and the other in the foreign country, producing substitute goods for consumption in a third country. We suppose that neither the home government nor the foreign firm know the costs of the home firm, while the foreign firm cost is common knowledge. We determine the separating sequential equilibrium outputs.