Determination of free furfuryl alcohol in foundry resins by chromatographic techniques

Two chromatographic methods, gas chromatography with flow ionization detection (GC–FID) and liquid chromatography with ultraviolet detection (LC–UV), were used to determine furfuryl alcohol in several kinds of foundry resins, after application of an optimised extraction procedure. The GC method developed gave feasibility that did not depend on resin kind. Analysis by LC was suitable just for furanic resins. The presence of interference in the phenolic resins did not allow an appropriate quantification by LC. Both methods gave accurate and precise results. Recoveries were >94%; relative standard deviations were ≤7 and ≤0.3%, respectively for GC and LC methods. Good relative deviations between the two methods were found (≤3%).

Licensing in an international triopoly

We study the effects of entry of two foreign firms on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the incumbent is technologically superior to the entrants. We consider two different situations: (i) the cost-reducing innovation is licensed to both entrants; (ii) the cost- reducing innovation is licensed to just one of the entrants. We analyse three kind of license: (lump- sum) fixed-fee; (per-unit) royalty; and two-part tariff, that is a combination of a fixed-fee and a royalty. We prove that a two part tariff is never an optimal licensing scheme for the incumbent. Moreover, (i) when the technology is licensed to the two entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only output royalty; and (ii) when the technology is licensed to just one of the entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only a fixed-fee.

Per-unit royalty and fixed-fee licensing in a differentiated Stackelberg model

In the present paper we consider a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is to study the licensing of the cost-reduction by a per-unit royalty and a fixed-fee. We analyse the implications of these types of licensing contracts over the R&D effort, the profits of the firms, the consumer surplus and the social welfare. By using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods plays an important role in the results.