Social welfare with a foreign competitor

In this paper, we consider a mixed market in which a state-owned welfare-maximizing public (domestic) firm competes against a profit-maximizing private (foreign) firm. We suppose that the domestic firm is less eflScient than the foreign firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of entry of a foreign firm on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare.

Strategic trade policy and signaling costs with differentiated goods

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.

Transmission costs allocation based on optimal re-dispatch

Congestion management of transmission power systems has achieve high relevance in competitive environments, which require an adequate approach both in technical and economic terms. This paper proposes a new methodology for congestion management and transmission tariff determination in deregulated electricity markets. The congestion management methodology is based on a reformulated optimal power flow, whose main goal is to obtain a feasible solution for the re-dispatch minimizing the changes in the transactions resulting from market operation. The proposed transmission tariffs consider the physical impact caused by each market agents in the transmission network. The final tariff considers existing system costs and also costs due to the initial congestion situation and losses. This paper includes a case study for the 118 bus IEEE test case.

Bertrand oligopoly when rivals' costs are unknown

We study a Bertrand oligopoly model with incomplete information about rivals' costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game, the ex-ante expected profit and the ex-post profit of each firm. We see that, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Privatization and entry of a foreign firm with demand uncertainty

We investigate the effects of trade with a foreign firm and privatization of the domestic pubUc firm on an incentive for the domestic firm to reduce costs by undertaking R&D investment, under demand uncertainty. We suppose that the domestic firm is less efficient than the foreign firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of entry of a foreign firm, and the effects of demand uncertainty, on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare.

Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknown

We study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian- Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price competition, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Reabilitação de uma instituição particular de solidariedade social (IPSS)

Mestrado em Engenharia Civil - Construções

Maximizing the Social Welfare of Virtual Power Players Operation in Case of Excessive Wind Power

The integration of growing amounts of distributed generation in power systems, namely at distribution networks level, has been fostered by energy policies in several countries around the world, including in Europe. This intensive integration of distributed, non-dispatchable, and natural sources based generation (including wind power) has caused several changes in the operation and planning of power systems and of electricity markets. Sometimes the available non-dispatchable generation is higher than the demand. This generation must be used; otherwise it is wasted if not stored or used to supply additional demand. New policies and market rules, as well as new players, are needed in order to competitively integrate all the resources. The methodology proposed in this paper aims at the maximization of the social welfare in a distribution network operated by a virtual power player that aggregates and manages the available energy resources. When facing a situation of excessive non-dispatchable generation, including wind power, real time pricing is applied in order to induce the increase of consumption so that wind curtailment is minimized. This method is especially useful when actual and day-ahead resources forecast differ significantly. The distribution network characteristics and concerns are addressed by including the network constraints in the optimization model. The proposed methodology has been implemented in GAMS optimization tool and its application is illustrated in this paper using a real 937-bus distribution network with 20.310 consumers and 548 distributed generators, some of them non-dispatchable and with must take contracts. The implemented scenario corresponds to a real day in Portuguese power system.