Determinantes da localização do Investimento direto estrangeiro nas economias emergentes

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças, sob orientação da Doutora Celsa Maria de Carvalho Machado

Energy and delay trade-off of the GTS allocation mechanism in IEEE 802.15.4 for wireless sensor networks

The IEEE 802.15.4 protocol proposes a flexible communication solution for Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (LR-WPAN) including wireless sensor networks (WSNs). It presents the advantage to fit different requirements of potential applications by adequately setting its parameters. When in beaconenabled mode, the protocol can provide timeliness guarantees by using its Guaranteed Time Slot (GTS) mechanism. However, power-efficiency and timeliness guarantees are often two antagonistic requirements in wireless sensor networks. The purpose of this paper is to analyze and propose a methodology for setting the relevant parameters of IEEE 802.15.4-compliant WSNs that takes into account a proper trade-off between power-efficiency and delay bound guarantees. First, we propose two accurate models of service curves for a GTS allocation as a function of the IEEE 802.15.4 parameters, using Network Calculus formalism. We then evaluate the delay bound guaranteed by a GTS allocation and express it as a function of the duty cycle. Based on the relation between the delay requirement and the duty cycle, we propose a power-efficient superframe selection method that simultaneously reduces power consumption and enables meeting the delay requirements of real-time flows allocating GTSs. The results of this work may pave the way for a powerefficient management of the GTS mechanism in an IEEE 802.15.4 cluster.

Motivations to participate in international trade fairs: the Portuguese experience

Motivations/barriers to participate in ITF

Strategic trade policy and signaling costs with differentiated goods

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.