Desirable role in an international duopoly model with tariffs

In this paper, we study an international market model in which the home government imposes a tariff on the imported goods. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize a function that cares about the home firm’s profit and the total revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

International Stackelberg model with tariffs

This paper analyses the effects of tariffs on an international economy with a monopolistic sector with two firms, located in two countries, each one producing a homogeneous good for both home consumption and export to the other identical country. We consider a game among governments and firms. First, the government imposes a tariff on imports and then we consider the two types of moving: simultaneous (Cournot-type model) and sequential (Stackelberg-type model) decisions by the firms. We also compare the results obtained in each model.

International duopoly with unknown costs

We consider two firms, located in different countries, selling the same homogeneous good in both countries. In each country there is a non negative tariff on imports of the good produced in the other country. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We analyse the effect of the production costs uncertainty on the profits of the firms and also on the welfare of the governments.

Transmission costs allocation based on optimal re-dispatch

Congestion management of transmission power systems has achieve high relevance in competitive environments, which require an adequate approach both in technical and economic terms. This paper proposes a new methodology for congestion management and transmission tariff determination in deregulated electricity markets. The congestion management methodology is based on a reformulated optimal power flow, whose main goal is to obtain a feasible solution for the re-dispatch minimizing the changes in the transactions resulting from market operation. The proposed transmission tariffs consider the physical impact caused by each market agents in the transmission network. The final tariff considers existing system costs and also costs due to the initial congestion situation and losses. This paper includes a case study for the 118 bus IEEE test case.

An integrated system to support electricity tariff contract definition

This paper presents an integrated system that helps both retail companies and electricity consumers on the definition of the best retail contracts and tariffs. This integrated system is composed by a Decision Support System (DSS) based on a Consumer Characterization Framework (CCF). The CCF is based on data mining techniques, applied to obtain useful knowledge about electricity consumers from large amounts of consumption data. This knowledge is acquired following an innovative and systematic approach able to identify different consumers’ classes, represented by a load profile, and its characterization using decision trees. The framework generates inputs to use in the knowledge base and in the database of the DSS. The rule sets derived from the decision trees are integrated in the knowledge base of the DSS. The load profiles together with the information about contracts and electricity prices form the database of the DSS. This DSS is able to perform the classification of different consumers, present its load profile and test different electricity tariffs and contracts. The final outputs of the DSS are a comparative economic analysis between different contracts and advice about the most economic contract to each consumer class. The presentation of the DSS is completed with an application example using a real data base of consumers from the Portuguese distribution company.

Maximum-revenue tariff with different roles in a price-setting competition

Published also at Lecture Notes in Engineering and Computer Science