A data-mining-based methodology for transmission expansion planning

In recent decades, all over the world, competition in the electric power sector has deeply changed the way this sector’s agents play their roles. In most countries, electric process deregulation was conducted in stages, beginning with the clients of higher voltage levels and with larger electricity consumption, and later extended to all electrical consumers. The sector liberalization and the operation of competitive electricity markets were expected to lower prices and improve quality of service, leading to greater consumer satisfaction. Transmission and distribution remain noncompetitive business areas, due to the large infrastructure investments required. However, the industry has yet to clearly establish the best business model for transmission in a competitive environment. After generation, the electricity needs to be delivered to the electrical system nodes where demand requires it, taking into consideration transmission constraints and electrical losses. If the amount of power flowing through a certain line is close to or surpasses the safety limits, then cheap but distant generation might have to be replaced by more expensive closer generation to reduce the exceeded power flows. In a congested area, the optimal price of electricity rises to the marginal cost of the local generation or to the level needed to ration demand to the amount of available electricity. Even without congestion, some power will be lost in the transmission system through heat dissipation, so prices reflect that it is more expensive to supply electricity at the far end of a heavily loaded line than close to an electric power generation. Locational marginal pricing (LMP), resulting from bidding competition, represents electrical and economical values at nodes or in areas that may provide economical indicator signals to the market agents. This article proposes a data-mining-based methodology that helps characterize zonal prices in real power transmission networks. To test our methodology, we used an LMP database from the California Independent System Operator for 2009 to identify economical zones. (CAISO is a nonprofit public benefit corporation charged with operating the majority of California’s high-voltage wholesale power grid.) To group the buses into typical classes that represent a set of buses with the approximate LMP value, we used two-step and k-means clustering algorithms. By analyzing the various LMP components, our goal was to extract knowledge to support the ISO in investment and network-expansion planning.

Energy and delay trade-off of the GTS allocation mechanism in IEEE 802.15.4 for wireless sensor networks

The IEEE 802.15.4 protocol proposes a flexible communication solution for Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (LR-WPAN) including wireless sensor networks (WSNs). It presents the advantage to fit different requirements of potential applications by adequately setting its parameters. When in beaconenabled mode, the protocol can provide timeliness guarantees by using its Guaranteed Time Slot (GTS) mechanism. However, power-efficiency and timeliness guarantees are often two antagonistic requirements in wireless sensor networks. The purpose of this paper is to analyze and propose a methodology for setting the relevant parameters of IEEE 802.15.4-compliant WSNs that takes into account a proper trade-off between power-efficiency and delay bound guarantees. First, we propose two accurate models of service curves for a GTS allocation as a function of the IEEE 802.15.4 parameters, using Network Calculus formalism. We then evaluate the delay bound guaranteed by a GTS allocation and express it as a function of the duty cycle. Based on the relation between the delay requirement and the duty cycle, we propose a power-efficient superframe selection method that simultaneously reduces power consumption and enables meeting the delay requirements of real-time flows allocating GTSs. The results of this work may pave the way for a powerefficient management of the GTS mechanism in an IEEE 802.15.4 cluster.

Motivations to participate in international trade fairs: the Portuguese experience

Motivations/barriers to participate in ITF

Strategic trade policy and signaling costs with differentiated goods

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.