Transmission cost allocation using cooperative game theory: a comparative study

In this paper is presented a Game Theory based methodology to allocate transmission costs, considering cooperation and competition between producers. As original contribution, it finds the degree of participation on the additional costs according to the demand behavior. A comparative study was carried out between the obtained results using Nucleolus balance and Shapley Value, with other techniques such as Averages Allocation method and the Generalized Generation Distribution Factors method (GGDF). As example, a six nodes network was used for the simulations. The results demonstrate the ability to find adequate solutions on open access environment to the networks.

Quais os motivos do insucesso de algumas crianças na aprendizagem musical? Motivação e Flow Theory

Este artigo aborda a natureza da motivação na sua relação com a aprendizagem musical. Um dos objectivos principais é problematizar a questão das diferenças no sucesso da aprendizagem musical quando nos encontramos perante indivíduos com níveis aparentemente semelhantes de capacidade e potencial musicais. Começa por apresentar um conjunto de modelos teóricos que oferecem uma visão acerca das razões que podem explicar as variações e mudanças na motivação. Refere-se investigação recente que sugere que os processos motivacionais não são pré-determinados mas podem ser aprendidos e que os indivíduos, para atingir níveis elevados de sucesso, necessitam de uma focagem no processo por oposição a uma focagem no produto. São introduzidos e explorados processos cognitivos fundamentais relacionados com a aprendizagem musical (por exemplo, comportamento au to-regulado, papel da motivação intrínseca e extrínseca) . Como conclusão, sugerem-se algumas práticas específicas para que os professores possam reflectir acerca da melhor forma de encorajar e aumentar a motivação dos seus alunos para aprender música.

Strategic bidding in electricity markets: an agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

An implicit GTS allocation mechanism in IEEE 802.15.4 for time-sensitive wireless sensor networks: theory and practice

Timeliness guarantee is an important feature of the recently standardized IEEE 802.15.4 protocol, turning it quite appealing for Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) applications under timing constraints. When operating in beacon-enabled mode, this protocol allows nodes with real-time requirements to allocate Guaranteed Time Slots (GTS) in the contention-free period. The protocol natively supports explicit GTS allocation, i.e. a node allocates a number of time slots in each superframe for exclusive use. The limitation of this explicit GTS allocation is that GTS resources may quickly disappear, since a maximum of seven GTSs can be allocated in each superframe, preventing other nodes to benefit from guaranteed service. Moreover, the GTS may be underutilized, resulting in wasted bandwidth. To overcome these limitations, this paper proposes i-GAME, an implicit GTS Allocation Mechanism in beacon-enabled IEEE 802.15.4 networks. The allocation is based on implicit GTS allocation requests, taking into account the traffic specifications and the delay requirements of the flows. The i-GAME approach enables the use of one GTS by multiple nodes, still guaranteeing that all their (delay, bandwidth) requirements are satisfied. For that purpose, we propose an admission control algorithm that enables to decide whether to accept a new GTS allocation request or not, based not only on the remaining time slots, but also on the traffic specifications of the flows, their delay requirements and the available bandwidth resources. We show that our approach improves the bandwidth utilization as compared to the native explicit allocation mechanism defined in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. We also present some practical considerations for the implementation of i-GAME, ensuring backward compatibility with the IEEE 801.5.4 standard with only minor add-ons. Finally, an experimental evaluation on a real system that validates our theoretical analysis and demonstrates the implementation of i-GAME is also presented

Object transportation by multiple mobile robots controlled by attractor dynamics: theory and implementation

Dynamical systems theory is used as a theoretical language and tool to design a distributed control architecture for teams of mobile robots, that must transport a large object and simultaneously avoid collisions with (either static or dynamic) obstacles. Here we demonstrate in simulations and implementations in real robots that it is possible to simplify the architectures presented in previous work and to extend the approach to teams of n robots. The robots have no prior knowledge of the environment. The motion of each robot is controlled by a time series of asymptotical stable states. The attractor dynamics permits the integration of information from various sources in a graded manner. As a result, the robots show a strikingly smooth an stable team behaviour.

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets: An agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

Coalition of distributed generation units to Virtual Power Players - a game theory approach

Smart Grids (SGs) have emerged as the new paradigm for power system operation and management, being designed to include large amounts of distributed energy resources. This new paradigm requires new Energy Resource Management (ERM) methodologies considering different operation strategies and the existence of new management players such as several types of aggregators. This paper proposes a methodology to facilitate the coalition between distributed generation units originating Virtual Power Players (VPP) considering a game theory approach. The proposed approach consists in the analysis of the classifications that were attributed by each VPP to the distributed generation units, as well as in the analysis of the previous established contracts by each player. The proposed classification model is based in fourteen parameters including technical, economical and behavioural ones. Depending of the VPP strategies, size and goals, each parameter has different importance. VPP can also manage other type of energy resources, like storage units, electric vehicles, demand response programs or even parts of the MV and LV distribution network. A case study with twelve VPPs with different characteristics and one hundred and fifty real distributed generation units is included in the paper.

Decision Support for Energy Contracts Negotiation with Game Theory and Adaptive Learning

This paper presents a decision support methodology for electricity market players’ bilateral contract negotiations. The proposed model is based on the application of game theory, using artificial intelligence to enhance decision support method’s adaptive features. This model is integrated in AiD-EM (Adaptive Decision Support for Electricity Markets Negotiations), a multi-agent system that provides electricity market players with strategic behavior capabilities to improve their outcomes from energy contracts’ negotiations. Although a diversity of tools that enable the study and simulation of electricity markets has emerged during the past few years, these are mostly directed to the analysis of market models and power systems’ technical constraints, making them suitable tools to support decisions of market operators and regulators. However, the equally important support of market negotiating players’ decisions is being highly neglected. The proposed model contributes to overcome the existing gap concerning effective and realistic decision support for electricity market negotiating entities. The proposed method is validated by realistic electricity market simulations using real data from the Iberian market operator—MIBEL. Results show that the proposed adaptive decision support features enable electricity market players to improve their outcomes from bilateral contracts’ negotiations.

O contrato psicológico na expatriação

Nos últimos anos, o número de expatriados tem apresentado uma tendência de crescimento a nível mundial. Desta forma, a gestão de expatriados, que integra o subsistema da gestão internacional de recursos humanos, passa a ter uma atenção renovada e tem vindo a crescer enquanto área de intervenção de gestão de recursos humanos. Por sua vez, o contrato psicológico tem sido visto, cada vez mais, como um fator relevante na explicação das relações laborais e o número de estudos em torno desta temática tem aumentado. O sucesso da expatriação é diretamente influenciado pelo contrato psicológico e depende, em grande parte, da forma como são desenvolvidas as práticas de GRH (Homem & Tolfo, 2008). Desta forma, é essencial compreender a reação dos trabalhadores perante a mudança (Bligh & Carsten, 2005; Shield, Thorpe, & Nelson, 2002), uma vez que o comportamento de resposta aos mesmos pode ser um contributo para marcar a diferença decisiva entre o sucesso ou o fracasso da missão internacional. Neste mesmo contexto, assiste-se a uma crescente atenção sobre o contributo que o Contrato Psicológico pode ter em contextos de incerteza. O individuo, enquanto trabalhador de uma organização que decide aceitar uma missão internacional e ir viver para outro país, tem necessidade de se enquadrar num relacionamento contínuo e motivador com a entidade empregadora. A noção do contrato psicológico torna-se fundamental para o entendimento das relações de trabalho, a partir das perceções das pessoas envolvidas. Muitos dos aspetos destes relacionamentos são implícitos (não escritos) o que pode provocar diferentes interpretações sobre as expectativas, promessas e obrigações entre partes. Vários autores defendem que o contrato psicológico é um meio fundamental na compreensão e gestão das atitudes e comportamentos dos indivíduos nas organizações (Bunderson, 2001; Kraimer, Wayne, Liden, & Sparrow, 2005; Lemire & Rouillard, 2005). O objetivo deste trabalho é conhecer o estado do contrato psicológico nos expatriados: antes da missão, após a fase de adaptação ao país de destino e na repatriação. Foi utilizada a metodologia qualitativa e para tal, foi aplicada uma entrevista individual semiestruturada e um questionário sociográfico às pessoas que se encontravam, à data, expatriadas. No total foram realizadas dez entrevistas e a análise das entrevistas foi efetuada através da Grounded Theory. Os resultados sugerem que há apenas cumprimento do contrato psicológico na fase da preparação da missão internacional, havendo, por outro lado, incumprimento do contrato psicológico durante a expatriação e na repatriação, de acordo com a perceção que os expatriados têm acerca do fim da expatriação. No entanto, a maioria dos expatriados entrevistados avalia positivamente a experiência da expatriação, apesar de as organizações parecerem ter apenas algumas regras estabelecidas de suporte ao expatriado, nomeadamente suporte logístico e financeiro, e não disporem de um programa completo e aprofundado de suporte à gestão da expatriação. Os resultados sugerem ainda que é essencial que as organizações estimulem a comunicação com os expatriados e fomentem o suporte que deve ser constante e intrínseco a todas as fases da expatriação, a fim de evitar a sensação de “abandono”.

Fiscal decentralisation and economic theory

There is no complete overview or discussion of the literature of the economics of federalism and fiscal decentralization, even though scholarly interest in the topic has been increasing significantly over recent years. This paper provides a general, brief but comprehensive overview of the main insights from the literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization. In doing so, literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization is grouped into two main approaches: “first generation of theories” and “second generation of theories”.