Transmission cost allocation using cooperative game theory: a comparative study

In this paper is presented a Game Theory based methodology to allocate transmission costs, considering cooperation and competition between producers. As original contribution, it finds the degree of participation on the additional costs according to the demand behavior. A comparative study was carried out between the obtained results using Nucleolus balance and Shapley Value, with other techniques such as Averages Allocation method and the Generalized Generation Distribution Factors method (GGDF). As example, a six nodes network was used for the simulations. The results demonstrate the ability to find adequate solutions on open access environment to the networks.

Solving a signalized traffic intersection problem with an hyperbolic penalty function

Mathematical Program with Complementarity Constraints (MPCC) finds many applications in fields such as engineering design, economic equilibrium and mathematical programming theory itself. A queueing system model resulting from a single signalized intersection regulated by pre-timed control in traffic network is considered. The model is formulated as an MPCC problem. A MATLAB implementation based on an hyperbolic penalty function is used to solve this practical problem, computing the total average waiting time of the vehicles in all queues and the green split allocation. The problem was codified in AMPL.

Strategic bidding in electricity markets: an agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

Legal and political regulation of higher education in Portugal: an evolutionary perspective on the current policy issues and the problem of order

The higher education system in Europe is currently under stress and the debates over its reform and future are gaining momentum. Now that, for most countries, we are in a time for change, in the overall society and the whole education system, the legal and political dimensions have gained prominence, which has not been followed by a more integrative approach of the problem of order, its reform and the issue of regulation, beyond the typical static and classical cost-benefit analyses. The two classical approaches for studying (and for designing the policy measures of) the problem of the reform of the higher education system - the cost-benefit analysis and the legal scholarship description - have to be integrated. This is the argument of our paper that the very integration of economic and legal approaches, what Warren Samuels called the legal-economic nexus, is meaningful and necessary, especially if we want to address the problem of order (as formulated by Joseph Spengler) and the overall regulation of the system. On the one hand, and without neglecting the interest and insights gained from the cost-benefit analysis, or other approaches of value for money assessment, we will focus our study on the legal, social and political aspects of the regulation of the higher education system and its reform in Portugal. On the other hand, the economic and financial problems have to be taken into account, but in a more inclusive way with regard to the indirect and other socio-economic costs not contemplated in traditional or standard assessments of policies for the tertiary education sector. In the first section of the paper, we will discuss the theoretical and conceptual underpinning of our analysis, focusing on the evolutionary approach, the role of critical institutions, the legal-economic nexus and the problem of order. All these elements are related to the institutional tradition, from Veblen and Commons to Spengler and Samuels. The second section states the problem of regulation in the higher education system and the issue of policy formulation for tackling the problem. The current situation is clearly one of crisis with the expansion of the cohorts of young students coming to an end and the recurrent scandals in private institutions. In the last decade, after a protracted period of extension or expansion of the system, i. e., the continuous growth of students, universities and other institutions are competing harder to gain students and have seen their financial situation at risk. It seems that we are entering a period of radical uncertainty, higher competition and a new configuration that is slowly building up is the growth in intensity, which means upgrading the quality of the higher learning and getting more involvement in vocational training and life-long learning. With this change, and along with other deep ones in the Portuguese society and economy, the current regulation has shown signs of maladjustment. The third section consists of our conclusions on the current issue of regulation and policy challenge. First, we underline the importance of an evolutionary approach to a process of change that is essentially dynamic. A special attention will be given to the issues related to an evolutionary construe of policy analysis and formulation. Second, the integration of law and economics, through the notion of legal economic nexus, allows us to better define the issues of regulation and the concrete problems that the universities are facing. One aspect is the instability of the political measures regarding the public administration and on which the higher education system depends financially, legally and institutionally, to say the least. A corollary is the lack of clear strategy in the policy reforms. Third, our research criticizes several studies, such as the one made by the OECD in late 2006 for the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education, for being too static and neglecting fundamental aspects of regulation such as the logic of actors, groups and organizations who are major players in the system. Finally, simply changing the legal rules will not necessary per se change the behaviors that the authorities want to change. By this, we mean that it is not only remiss of the policy maker to ignore some of the critical issues of regulation, namely the continuous non-respect by academic management and administrative bodies of universities of the legal rules that were once promulgated. Changing the rules does not change the problem, especially without the necessary debates form the different relevant quarters that make up the higher education system. The issues of social interaction remain as intact. Our treatment of the matter will be organized in the following way. In the first section, the theoretical principles are developed in order to be able to study more adequately the higher education transformation with a modest evolutionary theory and a legal and economic nexus of the interactions of the system and the policy challenges. After describing, in the second section, the recent evolution and current working of the higher education in Portugal, we will analyze the legal framework and the current regulatory practices and problems in light of the theoretical framework adopted. We will end with some conclusions on the current problems of regulation and the policy measures that are discusses in recent years.

Two protocols without periodicity for the global and preemptive scheduling problem of multi-mode real-time systems upon multiprocessor Platforms

We consider the problem of scheduling a multi-mode real-time system upon identical multiprocessor platforms. Since it is a multi-mode system, the system can change from one mode to another such that the current task set is replaced with a new task set. Ensuring that deadlines are met requires not only that a schedulability test is performed on tasks in each mode but also that (i) a protocol for transitioning from one mode to another is specified and (ii) a schedulability test for each transition is performed. We propose two protocols which ensure that all the expected requirements are met during every transition between every pair of operating modes of the system. Moreover, we prove the correctness of our proposed algorithms by extending the theory about the makespan determination problem.

Competitive dynamics for behavior coordination in a joint transportation task

We address the problem of coordinating two non-holonomic mobile robots that move in formation while transporting a long payload. A competitive dynamics is introduced that gradually controls the activation and deactivation of individual behaviors. This process introduces (asymmetrical) hysteresis during behavioral switching. As a result behavioral oscillations, due to noisy information, are eliminated. Results in indoor environments show that if parameter values are chosen within reasonable ranges then, in spite of noise in the robots communi- cation and sensors, the overall robotic system works quite well even in cluttered environments. The robots overt behavior is stable and smooth.

Reverse problem-based learning - a case study with a Braille machine

Engineering Education includes not only teaching theoretical fundamental concepts but also its verification during practical lessons in laboratories. The usual strategies to carry out this action are frequently based on Problem Based Learning, starting from a given state and proceeding forward to a target state. The possibility or the effectiveness of this procedure depends on previous states and if the present state was caused or resulted from earlier ones. This often happens in engineering education when the achieved results do not match the desired ones, e.g. when programming code is being developed or when the cause of the wrong behavior of an electronic circuit is being identified. It is thus important to also prepare students to proceed in the reverse way, i.e. given a start state generate the explanation or even the principles that underlie it. Later on, this sort of skills will be important. For instance, to a doctor making a patient?s story or to an engineer discovering the source of a malfunction. This learning methodology presents pedagogical advantages besides the enhanced preparation of students to their future work. The work presented on his document describes an automation project developed by a group of students in an engineering polytechnic school laboratory. The main objective was to improve the performance of a Braille machine. However, in a scenario of Reverse Problem-Based learning, students had first to discover and characterize the entire machine's function before being allowed (and being able) to propose a solution for the existing problem.

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets: An agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

Decision Support for Energy Contracts Negotiation with Game Theory and Adaptive Learning

This paper presents a decision support methodology for electricity market players’ bilateral contract negotiations. The proposed model is based on the application of game theory, using artificial intelligence to enhance decision support method’s adaptive features. This model is integrated in AiD-EM (Adaptive Decision Support for Electricity Markets Negotiations), a multi-agent system that provides electricity market players with strategic behavior capabilities to improve their outcomes from energy contracts’ negotiations. Although a diversity of tools that enable the study and simulation of electricity markets has emerged during the past few years, these are mostly directed to the analysis of market models and power systems’ technical constraints, making them suitable tools to support decisions of market operators and regulators. However, the equally important support of market negotiating players’ decisions is being highly neglected. The proposed model contributes to overcome the existing gap concerning effective and realistic decision support for electricity market negotiating entities. The proposed method is validated by realistic electricity market simulations using real data from the Iberian market operator—MIBEL. Results show that the proposed adaptive decision support features enable electricity market players to improve their outcomes from bilateral contracts’ negotiations.