Transmission cost allocation using cooperative game theory: a comparative study

In this paper is presented a Game Theory based methodology to allocate transmission costs, considering cooperation and competition between producers. As original contribution, it finds the degree of participation on the additional costs according to the demand behavior. A comparative study was carried out between the obtained results using Nucleolus balance and Shapley Value, with other techniques such as Averages Allocation method and the Generalized Generation Distribution Factors method (GGDF). As example, a six nodes network was used for the simulations. The results demonstrate the ability to find adequate solutions on open access environment to the networks.

TimeMesh: an educational historical game

The TIMEMESH game, developed in the scope of the European Project SELEAG, is an educational game for learning history, culture and social relations. It is supported by an extensible, online, multi-language, multi-player, collaborative and social platform for sharing and acquiring knowledge of the history of European regions. The game has been already used, with remarkable success, in different European countries like Portugal, Spain, England, Slovenia, Estonia and Belgium.

Stochastic short-term maintenance scheduling of GENCOs in an oligopolistic electricity market

In the proposed model, the independent system operator (ISO) provides the opportunity for maintenance outage rescheduling of generating units before each short-term (ST) time interval. Long-term (LT) scheduling for 1 or 2 years in advance is essential for the ISO and the generation companies (GENCOs) to decide their LT strategies; however, it is not possible to be exactly followed and requires slight adjustments. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is used to characterize the decision-making procedure of an individual GENCO for ST intervals considering the effective coordination with LT plans. Random inputs, such as parameters of the demand function of loads, hourly demand during the following ST time interval and the expected generation pattern of the rivals, are included as scenarios in the stochastic mixed integer program defined to model the payoff-maximizing objective of a GENCO. Scenario reduction algorithms are used to deal with the computational burden. Two reliability test systems were chosen to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed model for the ST decision-making process for future planned outages from the point of view of a GENCO.

Bertrand model under incomplete information

We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the price of its product according to the well-known concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The chooses are made simultaneously by both firms. In this paper, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with highest production cost versus the one with cheapest production cost. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.

Bertrand oligopoly when rivals' costs are unknown

We study a Bertrand oligopoly model with incomplete information about rivals' costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game, the ex-ante expected profit and the ex-post profit of each firm. We see that, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknown

We study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian- Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price competition, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets: An agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

Cournot model with investments to change the market size

We present a new deterministic dynamical model on the market size of Cournot competitions, based on Nash equilibria of R&D investment strategies to increase the size of the market of the firms at every period of the game. We compute the unique Nash equilibrium for the second subgame and the profit functions for both firms. Adding uncertainty to the R&D investment strategies, we get a new stochastic dynamical model and we analyse the importance of the uncertainty to reverse the initial advantage of one firm with respect to the other.

Coalition of distributed generation units to Virtual Power Players - a game theory approach

Smart Grids (SGs) have emerged as the new paradigm for power system operation and management, being designed to include large amounts of distributed energy resources. This new paradigm requires new Energy Resource Management (ERM) methodologies considering different operation strategies and the existence of new management players such as several types of aggregators. This paper proposes a methodology to facilitate the coalition between distributed generation units originating Virtual Power Players (VPP) considering a game theory approach. The proposed approach consists in the analysis of the classifications that were attributed by each VPP to the distributed generation units, as well as in the analysis of the previous established contracts by each player. The proposed classification model is based in fourteen parameters including technical, economical and behavioural ones. Depending of the VPP strategies, size and goals, each parameter has different importance. VPP can also manage other type of energy resources, like storage units, electric vehicles, demand response programs or even parts of the MV and LV distribution network. A case study with twelve VPPs with different characteristics and one hundred and fifty real distributed generation units is included in the paper.

A framework for real time MMO game content generation

Com o aumento de plataformas móveis disponíveis no mercado e com o constante incremento na sua capacidade computacional, a possibilidade de executar aplicações e em especial jogos com elevados requisitos de desempenho aumentou consideravelmente. O mercado dos videojogos tem assim um cada vez maior número de potenciais clientes. Em especial, o mercado de jogos massive multiplayer online (MMO) tem-se tornado muito atractivo para as empresas de desenvolvimento de jogos. Estes jogos suportam uma elevada quantidade de jogadores em simultâneo que podem estar a executar o jogo em diferentes plataformas e distribuídos por um "mundo" de jogo extenso. Para incentivar a exploração desse "mundo", distribuem-se de forma inteligente pontos de interesse que podem ser explorados pelo jogador. Esta abordagem leva a um esforço substancial no planeamento e construção desses mundos, gastando tempo e recursos durante a fase de desenvolvimento. Isto representa um problema para as empresas de desenvolvimento de jogos, e em alguns casos, e impraticável suportar tais custos para equipas indie. Nesta tese e apresentada uma abordagem para a criação de mundos para jogos MMO. Estudam-se vários jogos MMO que são casos de sucesso de modo a identificar propriedades comuns nos seus mundos. O objectivo e criar uma framework flexível capaz de gerar mundos com estruturas que respeitam conjuntos de regras definidas por game designers. Para que seja possível usar a abordagem aqui apresentada em v arias aplicações diferentes, foram desenvolvidos dois módulos principais. O primeiro, chamado rule-based-map-generator, contem a lógica e operações necessárias para a criação de mundos. O segundo, chamado blocker, e um wrapper à volta do módulo rule-based-map-generator que gere as comunicações entre servidor e clientes. De uma forma resumida, o objectivo geral e disponibilizar uma framework para facilitar a geração de mundos para jogos MMO, o que normalmente e um processo bastante demorado e aumenta significativamente o custo de produção, através de uma abordagem semi-automática combinando os benefícios de procedural content generation (PCG) com conteúdo gráfico gerado manualmente.