Stochastic short-term maintenance scheduling of GENCOs in an oligopolistic electricity market

In the proposed model, the independent system operator (ISO) provides the opportunity for maintenance outage rescheduling of generating units before each short-term (ST) time interval. Long-term (LT) scheduling for 1 or 2 years in advance is essential for the ISO and the generation companies (GENCOs) to decide their LT strategies; however, it is not possible to be exactly followed and requires slight adjustments. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is used to characterize the decision-making procedure of an individual GENCO for ST intervals considering the effective coordination with LT plans. Random inputs, such as parameters of the demand function of loads, hourly demand during the following ST time interval and the expected generation pattern of the rivals, are included as scenarios in the stochastic mixed integer program defined to model the payoff-maximizing objective of a GENCO. Scenario reduction algorithms are used to deal with the computational burden. Two reliability test systems were chosen to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed model for the ST decision-making process for future planned outages from the point of view of a GENCO.

Bertrand model under incomplete information

We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the price of its product according to the well-known concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The chooses are made simultaneously by both firms. In this paper, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with highest production cost versus the one with cheapest production cost. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.

Bertrand oligopoly when rivals' costs are unknown

We study a Bertrand oligopoly model with incomplete information about rivals' costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game, the ex-ante expected profit and the ex-post profit of each firm. We see that, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Cournot competition between a non-profit firm and a for-profit firm with uncertainty

In this paper, we consider a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand. Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analyze the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.

Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknown

We study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian- Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price competition, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Strategic trade policy and signaling costs with differentiated goods

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.

Cournot model with investments to change the market size

We present a new deterministic dynamical model on the market size of Cournot competitions, based on Nash equilibria of R&D investment strategies to increase the size of the market of the firms at every period of the game. We compute the unique Nash equilibrium for the second subgame and the profit functions for both firms. Adding uncertainty to the R&D investment strategies, we get a new stochastic dynamical model and we analyse the importance of the uncertainty to reverse the initial advantage of one firm with respect to the other.

Copper and lead removal by peanut hulls: equilibrium and kinetic studies

This research work aims to study the use of peanut hulls, an agricultural and food industry waste, for copper and lead removal through equilibrium and kinetic parameters evaluation. Equilibrium batch studies were performed in a batch adsorber. The influence of initial pH was evaluated (3–5) and it was selected between 4.0 and 4.5. The maximum sorption capacities obtained for the Langmuir model were 0.21 ± 0.03 and 0.18 ± 0.02 mmol/g, respectively for copper and lead. In bi-component systems, competitive sorption of copper and lead was verified, the total amount adsorbed being around 0.21 mmol of metal per gram of material in both mono and bi-component systems. In the kinetic studies equilibrium was reached after 200 min contact time using a 400 rpm stirring rate, achieving 78% and 58% removal, in mono-component system, for copper and lead respectively. Their removal follows a pseudo-second-order kinetics. These studies show that most of the metals removal occurred in the first 20 min of contact, which shows a good uptake rate in all systems.

A physical packing sequence algorithm for the container loading problem with static mechanical equilibrium conditions

The container loading problem (CLP) is a combinatorial optimization problem for the spatial arrangement of cargo inside containers so as to maximize the usage of space. The algorithms for this problem are of limited practical applicability if real-world constraints are not considered, one of the most important of which is deemed to be stability. This paper addresses static stability, as opposed to dynamic stability, looking at the stability of the cargo during container loading. This paper proposes two algorithms. The first is a static stability algorithm based on static mechanical equilibrium conditions that can be used as a stability evaluation function embedded in CLP algorithms (e.g. constructive heuristics, metaheuristics). The second proposed algorithm is a physical packing sequence algorithm that, given a container loading arrangement, generates the actual sequence by which each box is placed inside the container, considering static stability and loading operation efficiency constraints.

Separating sequential equilibrium in a Bayesian international duopoly

We consider two Cournot firms, one located in the home country and the other in the foreign country, producing substitute goods for consumption in a third country. We suppose that neither the home government nor the foreign firm know the costs of the home firm, while the foreign firm cost is common knowledge. We determine the separating sequential equilibrium outputs.