Monetary and fiscal policies interactions in a monetary union with country-size asymmetry

Within a country-size asymmetric monetary union, idiosyncratic shocks and national fiscal stabilization policies cause asymmetric cross-border effects. These effects are a source of strategic interactions between noncoordinated fiscal and monetary policies: on the one hand, due to larger externalities imposed on the union, large countries face less incentives to develop free-riding fiscal policies; on the other hand, a larger strategic position vis-à-vis the central bank incentives the use of fiscal policy to, deliberately, influence monetary policy. Additionally, the existence of non-distortionary government financing may also shape policy interactions. As a result, optimal policy regimes may diverge not only across the union members, but also between the latter and the monetary union. In a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian model for a monetary union, we consider two fiscal policy scenarios: (i) lump-sum taxes are raised to fully finance the government budget and (ii) lump-sum taxes do not ensure balanced budgets in each period; therefore, fiscal and monetary policies are expected to impinge on debt sustainability. For several degrees of country-size asymmetry, we compute optimal discretionary and dynamic non-cooperative policy games and compare their stabilization performance using a union-wide welfare measure. We also assess whether these outcomes could be improved, for the monetary union, through institutional policy arrangements. We find that, in the presence of government indebtedness, monetary policy optimally deviates from macroeconomic to debt stabilization. We also find that policy cooperation is always welfare increasing for the monetary union as a whole; however, indebted large countries may strongly oppose to this arrangement in favour of fiscal leadership. In this case, delegation of monetary policy to a conservative central bank proves to be fruitful to improve the union’s welfare.

Stabilization constraints from different-average public debt levels in a Monetary Union with country-size asymmetry

In the sequence of the recent financial and economic crisis, the recent public debt accumulation is expected to hamper considerably business cycle stabilization, by enlarging the budgetary consequences of the shocks. This paper analyses how the average level of public debt in a monetary union shapes optimal discretionary fiscal and monetary stabilization policies and affects stabilization welfare. We use a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian model, where a benevolent central bank and the fiscal authorities play discretionary policy games under different union-average debt-constrained scenarios. We find that high debt levels shift monetary policy assignment from inflation to debt stabilization, making cooperation welfare superior to noncooperation. Moreover, when average debt is too high, welfare moves directly (inversely) with debt-to-output ratios for the union and the large country (small country) under cooperation. However, under non-cooperation, higher average debt levels benefit only the large country.

Transmission cost allocation using cooperative game theory: a comparative study

In this paper is presented a Game Theory based methodology to allocate transmission costs, considering cooperation and competition between producers. As original contribution, it finds the degree of participation on the additional costs according to the demand behavior. A comparative study was carried out between the obtained results using Nucleolus balance and Shapley Value, with other techniques such as Averages Allocation method and the Generalized Generation Distribution Factors method (GGDF). As example, a six nodes network was used for the simulations. The results demonstrate the ability to find adequate solutions on open access environment to the networks.

Quais os motivos do insucesso de algumas crianças na aprendizagem musical? Motivação e Flow Theory

Este artigo aborda a natureza da motivação na sua relação com a aprendizagem musical. Um dos objectivos principais é problematizar a questão das diferenças no sucesso da aprendizagem musical quando nos encontramos perante indivíduos com níveis aparentemente semelhantes de capacidade e potencial musicais. Começa por apresentar um conjunto de modelos teóricos que oferecem uma visão acerca das razões que podem explicar as variações e mudanças na motivação. Refere-se investigação recente que sugere que os processos motivacionais não são pré-determinados mas podem ser aprendidos e que os indivíduos, para atingir níveis elevados de sucesso, necessitam de uma focagem no processo por oposição a uma focagem no produto. São introduzidos e explorados processos cognitivos fundamentais relacionados com a aprendizagem musical (por exemplo, comportamento au to-regulado, papel da motivação intrínseca e extrínseca) . Como conclusão, sugerem-se algumas práticas específicas para que os professores possam reflectir acerca da melhor forma de encorajar e aumentar a motivação dos seus alunos para aprender música.

Strategic bidding in electricity markets: an agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

An implicit GTS allocation mechanism in IEEE 802.15.4 for time-sensitive wireless sensor networks: theory and practice

Timeliness guarantee is an important feature of the recently standardized IEEE 802.15.4 protocol, turning it quite appealing for Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) applications under timing constraints. When operating in beacon-enabled mode, this protocol allows nodes with real-time requirements to allocate Guaranteed Time Slots (GTS) in the contention-free period. The protocol natively supports explicit GTS allocation, i.e. a node allocates a number of time slots in each superframe for exclusive use. The limitation of this explicit GTS allocation is that GTS resources may quickly disappear, since a maximum of seven GTSs can be allocated in each superframe, preventing other nodes to benefit from guaranteed service. Moreover, the GTS may be underutilized, resulting in wasted bandwidth. To overcome these limitations, this paper proposes i-GAME, an implicit GTS Allocation Mechanism in beacon-enabled IEEE 802.15.4 networks. The allocation is based on implicit GTS allocation requests, taking into account the traffic specifications and the delay requirements of the flows. The i-GAME approach enables the use of one GTS by multiple nodes, still guaranteeing that all their (delay, bandwidth) requirements are satisfied. For that purpose, we propose an admission control algorithm that enables to decide whether to accept a new GTS allocation request or not, based not only on the remaining time slots, but also on the traffic specifications of the flows, their delay requirements and the available bandwidth resources. We show that our approach improves the bandwidth utilization as compared to the native explicit allocation mechanism defined in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. We also present some practical considerations for the implementation of i-GAME, ensuring backward compatibility with the IEEE 801.5.4 standard with only minor add-ons. Finally, an experimental evaluation on a real system that validates our theoretical analysis and demonstrates the implementation of i-GAME is also presented

Object transportation by multiple mobile robots controlled by attractor dynamics: theory and implementation

Dynamical systems theory is used as a theoretical language and tool to design a distributed control architecture for teams of mobile robots, that must transport a large object and simultaneously avoid collisions with (either static or dynamic) obstacles. Here we demonstrate in simulations and implementations in real robots that it is possible to simplify the architectures presented in previous work and to extend the approach to teams of n robots. The robots have no prior knowledge of the environment. The motion of each robot is controlled by a time series of asymptotical stable states. The attractor dynamics permits the integration of information from various sources in a graded manner. As a result, the robots show a strikingly smooth an stable team behaviour.

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets: An agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

Coalition of distributed generation units to Virtual Power Players - a game theory approach

Smart Grids (SGs) have emerged as the new paradigm for power system operation and management, being designed to include large amounts of distributed energy resources. This new paradigm requires new Energy Resource Management (ERM) methodologies considering different operation strategies and the existence of new management players such as several types of aggregators. This paper proposes a methodology to facilitate the coalition between distributed generation units originating Virtual Power Players (VPP) considering a game theory approach. The proposed approach consists in the analysis of the classifications that were attributed by each VPP to the distributed generation units, as well as in the analysis of the previous established contracts by each player. The proposed classification model is based in fourteen parameters including technical, economical and behavioural ones. Depending of the VPP strategies, size and goals, each parameter has different importance. VPP can also manage other type of energy resources, like storage units, electric vehicles, demand response programs or even parts of the MV and LV distribution network. A case study with twelve VPPs with different characteristics and one hundred and fifty real distributed generation units is included in the paper.

Decision Support for Energy Contracts Negotiation with Game Theory and Adaptive Learning

This paper presents a decision support methodology for electricity market players’ bilateral contract negotiations. The proposed model is based on the application of game theory, using artificial intelligence to enhance decision support method’s adaptive features. This model is integrated in AiD-EM (Adaptive Decision Support for Electricity Markets Negotiations), a multi-agent system that provides electricity market players with strategic behavior capabilities to improve their outcomes from energy contracts’ negotiations. Although a diversity of tools that enable the study and simulation of electricity markets has emerged during the past few years, these are mostly directed to the analysis of market models and power systems’ technical constraints, making them suitable tools to support decisions of market operators and regulators. However, the equally important support of market negotiating players’ decisions is being highly neglected. The proposed model contributes to overcome the existing gap concerning effective and realistic decision support for electricity market negotiating entities. The proposed method is validated by realistic electricity market simulations using real data from the Iberian market operator—MIBEL. Results show that the proposed adaptive decision support features enable electricity market players to improve their outcomes from bilateral contracts’ negotiations.

Tendências de recompensas em empresas portuguesas

Esta dissertação tem como objetivo central conhecer os sistemas de recompensas em empresas portuguesas. Primeiramente é realizada uma abordagem aos conceitos subjacentes ao sistema de recompensas e, simultaneamente é exposta teoria sobre o tipo de recompensas mais utilizadas e como estas diferem consoante o cargo/função. Foi aplicado um inquérito por questionário a uma amostra de 144 empresas localizadas por todo o país. Foram testadas hipóteses de estudo capazes de permitir caraterizar o sistema de recompensas desenvolvido nas empresas em estudo. Os resultados do estudo permitem concluir que: 1) os sistemas de recompensas baseados na antiguidade estão atualmente em desuso, ao contrário dos sistemas de recompensas baseados na função/cargo, no desempenho e nas competências; 2) o principal objetivo do sistema de recompensas das empresas do estudo é a motivação dos colaboradores; 3) a conjugação das recompensas monetárias e não monetárias são as mais valorizadas pelas empresas; 4) predomina a compensação variável nos sistemas de recompensas das empresas bem como os incentivos mistos (individuais e de grupo); 5) predominam os incentivos de curto-prazo no sistema de recompensas; 6) o bónus anual é o incentivo mais utilizado; 7) os benefícios e alguns dos incentivos tendem a ser maiores à medida que se sobe na hierarquia funcional da empresa; 8) o benefício predominante é a atribuição de telemóvel e o seguro de saúde; 9) as formas de reconhecimento mais comuns são os prémios de desempenho, o feedback contínuo, as promoções e as placas comemorativas; 10) a maioria dos inquiridos acredita que as oportunidades de desenvolvimento de carreira é uma importante medida para a retenção dos colaboradores; 11) as oportunidades de desenvolvimento são mais utilizadas pelas empresas de maior dimensão e; 12) os benefícios sociais são considerados a componente mais importante para garantir a retenção dos colaboradores. Com base nestes resultados, na parte final da dissertação são apresentadas algumas implicações teóricas e práticas, algumas limitações do estudo, bem como pistas para investigações futuras.

Fiscal decentralisation and economic theory

There is no complete overview or discussion of the literature of the economics of federalism and fiscal decentralization, even though scholarly interest in the topic has been increasing significantly over recent years. This paper provides a general, brief but comprehensive overview of the main insights from the literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization. In doing so, literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization is grouped into two main approaches: “first generation of theories” and “second generation of theories”.