Social welfare with a foreign competitor

In this paper, we consider a mixed market in which a state-owned welfare-maximizing public (domestic) firm competes against a profit-maximizing private (foreign) firm. We suppose that the domestic firm is less eflScient than the foreign firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of entry of a foreign firm on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare.

Privatization and entry of a foreign firm with demand uncertainty

We investigate the effects of trade with a foreign firm and privatization of the domestic pubUc firm on an incentive for the domestic firm to reduce costs by undertaking R&D investment, under demand uncertainty. We suppose that the domestic firm is less efficient than the foreign firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of entry of a foreign firm, and the effects of demand uncertainty, on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare.

Empreendedorismo internacional: plano de negócios de criação da GIBS

Dissertação apresentada ao Instituto Politécnico do Porto, Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto, para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Empreendedorismo e Internacionalização Orientador: Doutor Orlando Manuel Martins Marques de Lima Rua Coorientadora: Mestre Anabela Paula Alferes Ferreira Ribeiro

Virtual power players demand response programs management based on locational marginal prices

Power systems have been suffering huge changes mainly due to the substantial increase of distributed generation and to the operation in competitive environments. Virtual power players can aggregate a diversity of players, namely generators and consumers, and a diversity of energy resources, including electricity generation based on several technologies, storage and demand response. Resource management gains an increasing relevance in this competitive context, while demand side active role provides managers with increased demand elasticity. This makes demand response use more interesting and flexible, giving rise to a wide range of new opportunities.This paper proposes a methodology for managing demand response programs in the scope of virtual power players. The proposed method is based on the calculation of locational marginal prices (LMP). The evaluation of the impact of using demand response specific programs on the LMP value supports the manager decision concerning demand response use. The proposed method has been computationally implemented and its application is illustrated in this paper using a 32 bus network with intensive use of distributed generation.

Transmission costs allocation based on optimal re-dispatch

Congestion management of transmission power systems has achieve high relevance in competitive environments, which require an adequate approach both in technical and economic terms. This paper proposes a new methodology for congestion management and transmission tariff determination in deregulated electricity markets. The congestion management methodology is based on a reformulated optimal power flow, whose main goal is to obtain a feasible solution for the re-dispatch minimizing the changes in the transactions resulting from market operation. The proposed transmission tariffs consider the physical impact caused by each market agents in the transmission network. The final tariff considers existing system costs and also costs due to the initial congestion situation and losses. This paper includes a case study for the 118 bus IEEE test case.

Distribution system operation supported by contextual energy resource management based on intelligent SCADA

Future distribution systems will have to deal with an intensive penetration of distributed energy resources ensuring reliable and secure operation according to the smart grid paradigm. SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) is an essential infrastructure for this evolution. This paper proposes a new conceptual design of an intelligent SCADA with a decentralized, flexible, and intelligent approach, adaptive to the context (context awareness). This SCADA model is used to support the energy resource management undertaken by a distribution network operator (DNO). Resource management considers all the involved costs, power flows, and electricity prices, allowing the use of network reconfiguration and load curtailment. Locational Marginal Prices (LMP) are evaluated and used in specific situations to apply Demand Response (DR) programs on a global or a local basis. The paper includes a case study using a 114 bus distribution network and load demand based on real data.

Bertrand oligopoly when rivals' costs are unknown

We study a Bertrand oligopoly model with incomplete information about rivals' costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game, the ex-ante expected profit and the ex-post profit of each firm. We see that, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknown

We study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian- Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price competition, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Strategic trade policy and signaling costs with differentiated goods

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.