Bertrand model under incomplete information

We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the price of its product according to the well-known concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The chooses are made simultaneously by both firms. In this paper, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with highest production cost versus the one with cheapest production cost. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.

Information professionals in business context: new professionals, old skills

This communication aims to present some reflections regarding the importance of information in organizational context, especially in business context. The ability to produce and to share expertise and knowledge among its employees is now a key factor in the success of any organization. However, it’s also true that workers are increasingly feeling that too much information can hurt their performance. The existence of skilled professionals able to organize, evaluate, select and disseminate information in organizations appears to be a prerequisite for success. The skills necessary for the formation of a professional devoted to the management of information and knowledge in the context of business organizations will be analysed. Then data collected in two focus group discussion with students from a graduate course in Business Information, from Polytechnic Institute of Porto, Portugal, a will be examined.