Privatization and government preference in a public Stackelberg leader duopoly

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue in a Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm.

Assessment of direct radiological risk and indirect associated toxic risks originated by Coal-Fired Power Plants

Over the past few decades there has been some discussion concerning the increase of the natural background radiation originated by coal-fired power plants, due to the uranium and thorium content present in combustion ashes. The radioactive decay products of uranium and thorium, such as radium, radon, polonium, bismuth and lead, are also released in addition to a significant amount of 40K. Since the measurement of radioactive elements released by the gaseous emissions of coal power plants is not compulsory, there is a gap of information concerning this situation. Consequently, the prediction of dispersion and mobility of these elements in the environment, after their release, is based on limited data and the radiological impact from the exposure to these radioactive elements is unknown. This paper describes the methodology that is being developed to assess the radiological impact due to the raise in the natural background radiation level originated by the release and dispersion of the emitted radionuclides. The current investigation is part of a research project that is undergoing in the vicinity of Sines coal-fired power plant (south of Portugal) until 2013. Data from preliminary stages are already available and possible of interpretation.

Government preference, environmental taxes and privatization

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for environmental tax revenue. The model that we consider is more general than the one consider in Wang and Wang (2009), in the sense that we put a larger weight in the environment tax revenue than on the other terms of the government's objective function. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.