Stochastic Short-term Incentive-based Demand Response Scheduling of Load-serving Entities

In competitive electricity markets it is necessary for a profit-seeking load-serving entity (LSE) to optimally adjust the financial incentives offering the end users that buy electricity at regulated rates to reduce the consumption during high market prices. The LSE in this model manages the demand response (DR) by offering financial incentives to retail customers, in order to maximize its expected profit and reduce the risk of market power experience. The stochastic formulation is implemented into a test system where a number of loads are supplied through LSEs.

Incentive-based demand response programs designed by asset-light retailers for day-ahead market

Following the deregulation experience of retail electricity markets in most countries, the majority of the new entrants of the liberalized retail market were pure REP (retail electricity providers). These entities were subject to financial risks because of the unexpected price variations, price spikes, volatile loads and the potential for market power exertion by GENCO (generation companies). A REP can manage the market risks by employing the DR (demand response) programs and using its' generation and storage assets at the distribution network to serve the customers. The proposed model suggests how a REP with light physical assets, such as DG (distributed generation) units and ESS (energy storage systems), can survive in a competitive retail market. The paper discusses the effective risk management strategies for the REPs to deal with the uncertainties of the DAM (day-ahead market) and how to hedge the financial losses in the market. A two-stage stochastic programming problem is formulated. It aims to establish the financial incentive-based DR programs and the optimal dispatch of the DG units and ESSs. The uncertainty of the forecasted day-ahead load demand and electricity price is also taken into account with a scenario-based approach. The principal advantage of this model for REPs is reducing the risk of financial losses in DAMs, and the main benefit for the whole system is market power mitigation by virtually increasing the price elasticity of demand and reducing the peak demand.

A multi-objective model for scheduling of short-term incentive-based demand response programs offered by electricity retailers

In this paper, we formulate the electricity retailers’ short-term decision-making problem in a liberalized retail market as a multi-objective optimization model. Retailers with light physical assets, such as generation and storage units in the distribution network, are considered. Following advances in smart grid technologies, electricity retailers are becoming able to employ incentive-based demand response (DR) programs in addition to their physical assets to effectively manage the risks of market price and load variations. In this model, the DR scheduling is performed simultaneously with the dispatch of generation and storage units. The ultimate goal is to find the optimal values of the hourly financial incentives offered to the end-users. The proposed model considers the capacity obligations imposed on retailers by the grid operator. The profit seeking retailer also has the objective to minimize the peak demand to avoid the high capacity charges in form of grid tariffs or penalties. The non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm II (NSGA-II) is used to solve the multi-objective problem. It is a fast and elitist multi-objective evolutionary algorithm. A case study is solved to illustrate the efficient performance of the proposed methodology. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the model for designing the incentive-based DR programs and indicate the efficiency of NSGA-II in solving the retailers’ multi-objective problem.