Social welfare with a foreign competitor

In this paper, we consider a mixed market in which a state-owned welfare-maximizing public (domestic) firm competes against a profit-maximizing private (foreign) firm. We suppose that the domestic firm is less eflScient than the foreign firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of entry of a foreign firm on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare.

Maximizing the Social Welfare of Virtual Power Players Operation in Case of Excessive Wind Power

The integration of growing amounts of distributed generation in power systems, namely at distribution networks level, has been fostered by energy policies in several countries around the world, including in Europe. This intensive integration of distributed, non-dispatchable, and natural sources based generation (including wind power) has caused several changes in the operation and planning of power systems and of electricity markets. Sometimes the available non-dispatchable generation is higher than the demand. This generation must be used; otherwise it is wasted if not stored or used to supply additional demand. New policies and market rules, as well as new players, are needed in order to competitively integrate all the resources. The methodology proposed in this paper aims at the maximization of the social welfare in a distribution network operated by a virtual power player that aggregates and manages the available energy resources. When facing a situation of excessive non-dispatchable generation, including wind power, real time pricing is applied in order to induce the increase of consumption so that wind curtailment is minimized. This method is especially useful when actual and day-ahead resources forecast differ significantly. The distribution network characteristics and concerns are addressed by including the network constraints in the optimization model. The proposed methodology has been implemented in GAMS optimization tool and its application is illustrated in this paper using a real 937-bus distribution network with 20.310 consumers and 548 distributed generators, some of them non-dispatchable and with must take contracts. The implemented scenario corresponds to a real day in Portuguese power system.

Privatization and social welfare in an international mixed Stackelberg duopoly

Competition between public and private firms exists in a range of industries like telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, airlines industries, as weel as services including hospitals, banking and education. Some authors studied mixed oligopolies under Cournot competition (firms move simultaneously) and some others considered Stackelberg models (firms move sequentially). Tomaru [1] analyzed, in a Cournot model, how decision-making upon cost-reducing R&D investment by a domestic public firm is affected by privatization when competing in the domestic market with a foreign firm. He shows that privatization of the domestic public firm lowers productive efficiency and deteriorates domestic social welfare. In this paper, we examine the same question but in a Stackelberg formulation instead of Cournot. The model is a three-stage game. In the first stage, the domestic firm chooses the amount of cost-reducing R&D investment. Then, the firms compete à la Stackelberg. Two cases are considered: (i) The domestic firm is the leader; (ii) The foreign firm is the leader. We show that the results obtained in [1] for Cournot competition are robust in the sence that they are also true when firms move sequentially.

Welfare effects of entry into international markets with licensing

We study the effects of entry of a foreign firm on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the entrant is technologically inferior to the incumbent. We show that foreign entry increases domestic welfare for intermediate (respectively, sufficiently large) technological differences between the firms under licensing with fixed fee (respectively, output royalty).