Unified overhead-aware schedulability analysis for slot-based task-splitting

Hard real- time multiprocessor scheduling has seen, in recent years, the flourishing of semi-partitioned scheduling algorithms. This category of scheduling schemes combines elements of partitioned and global scheduling for the purposes of achieving efficient utilization of the system’s processing resources with strong schedulability guarantees and with low dispatching overheads. The sub-class of slot-based “task-splitting” scheduling algorithms, in particular, offers very good trade-offs between schedulability guarantees (in the form of high utilization bounds) and the number of preemptions/migrations involved. However, so far there did not exist unified scheduling theory for such algorithms; each one was formulated in its own accompanying analysis. This article changes this fragmented landscape by formulating a more unified schedulability theory covering the two state-of-the-art slot-based semi-partitioned algorithms, S-EKG and NPS-F (both fixed job-priority based). This new theory is based on exact schedulability tests, thus also overcoming many sources of pessimism in existing analysis. In turn, since schedulability testing guides the task assignment under the schemes in consideration, we also formulate an improved task assignment procedure. As the other main contribution of this article, and as a response to the fact that many unrealistic assumptions, present in the original theory, tend to undermine the theoretical potential of such scheduling schemes, we identified and modelled into the new analysis all overheads incurred by the algorithms in consideration. The outcome is a new overhead-aware schedulability analysis that permits increased efficiency and reliability. The merits of this new theory are evaluated by an extensive set of experiments.

Transmission cost allocation using cooperative game theory: a comparative study

In this paper is presented a Game Theory based methodology to allocate transmission costs, considering cooperation and competition between producers. As original contribution, it finds the degree of participation on the additional costs according to the demand behavior. A comparative study was carried out between the obtained results using Nucleolus balance and Shapley Value, with other techniques such as Averages Allocation method and the Generalized Generation Distribution Factors method (GGDF). As example, a six nodes network was used for the simulations. The results demonstrate the ability to find adequate solutions on open access environment to the networks.

Diderot, le grand satirique

Diderot est davantage un humaniste et un non-conformiste qui se préoccupe beaucoup de la stabilité et du confort de l‘existence humaine. Il croit que l‘homme est né pour vivre en société et qu‘il doit être heureux. Toute cette philosophie ressort de ses oeuvres dont l‘objectif est celui d‘aider les hommes à atteindre le bonheur: il s‘agit donc d‘une littérature engagée. La verve satirique de Diderot est le fil directeur d‘une oeuvre variée et diverse qui risque de décourager le lecteur paresseux. L‘élément satirique rassemble les articles de L‟Encyclopédie, les Salons et les oeuvres fictives de Diderot, comme par exemple, Le Neveu de Rameau, Jacques le Fataliste et son Maître et La Religieuse. Bien que L‟Encyclopédie soit une entreprise scientifique, Diderot cache, dans plusieurs articles, pour tromper la censure, des attaques virulentes contre la morale, la religion et ses institutions. Il critique aussi les superstitions et les croyances don‘t s‘entourent les religions. Dans les Salons, Diderot rédige des appréciations sur les tableaux de quelques peintres, parus dans plusieurs expositions. Mais Diderot ne les décrit pas en tant que technicien, il s‘en sert pour faire une parodie de ces peintures, utilisant très souvent un langage grossier et un style gaillard. La satire est le lien entre la non-fiction et la fiction. Dans ses oeuvres romanesques on trouve la satire sociale et littéraire : Diderot y met en question le genre romanesque traditionnel, par conséquent Le Neveu de Rameau, Jacques le Fataliste et son Maître et La Religieuse se caractérisent par un décousu apparent et désordonné – c‘est la forme amusante dont Diderot se sert pour révéler aux lecteurs que les romans traditionnels les trompent. La forme désorganisée sert aussi à montrer le manque de liberté dont l‘homme jouit – l‘homme n‘est qu‘un guignol manipulé par le destin. En effet, en « déconstruisant » le roman, Diderot oblige le lecteur à réfléchir sur la condition humaine et l‘illusion romanesque de telle façon que le lecteur ne sait plus ce qui est faux et ce qui est vrai, surtout dans le cas de La Religieuse.

Quais os motivos do insucesso de algumas crianças na aprendizagem musical? Motivação e Flow Theory

Este artigo aborda a natureza da motivação na sua relação com a aprendizagem musical. Um dos objectivos principais é problematizar a questão das diferenças no sucesso da aprendizagem musical quando nos encontramos perante indivíduos com níveis aparentemente semelhantes de capacidade e potencial musicais. Começa por apresentar um conjunto de modelos teóricos que oferecem uma visão acerca das razões que podem explicar as variações e mudanças na motivação. Refere-se investigação recente que sugere que os processos motivacionais não são pré-determinados mas podem ser aprendidos e que os indivíduos, para atingir níveis elevados de sucesso, necessitam de uma focagem no processo por oposição a uma focagem no produto. São introduzidos e explorados processos cognitivos fundamentais relacionados com a aprendizagem musical (por exemplo, comportamento au to-regulado, papel da motivação intrínseca e extrínseca) . Como conclusão, sugerem-se algumas práticas específicas para que os professores possam reflectir acerca da melhor forma de encorajar e aumentar a motivação dos seus alunos para aprender música.

Strategic bidding in electricity markets: an agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

An implicit GTS allocation mechanism in IEEE 802.15.4 for time-sensitive wireless sensor networks: theory and practice

Timeliness guarantee is an important feature of the recently standardized IEEE 802.15.4 protocol, turning it quite appealing for Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) applications under timing constraints. When operating in beacon-enabled mode, this protocol allows nodes with real-time requirements to allocate Guaranteed Time Slots (GTS) in the contention-free period. The protocol natively supports explicit GTS allocation, i.e. a node allocates a number of time slots in each superframe for exclusive use. The limitation of this explicit GTS allocation is that GTS resources may quickly disappear, since a maximum of seven GTSs can be allocated in each superframe, preventing other nodes to benefit from guaranteed service. Moreover, the GTS may be underutilized, resulting in wasted bandwidth. To overcome these limitations, this paper proposes i-GAME, an implicit GTS Allocation Mechanism in beacon-enabled IEEE 802.15.4 networks. The allocation is based on implicit GTS allocation requests, taking into account the traffic specifications and the delay requirements of the flows. The i-GAME approach enables the use of one GTS by multiple nodes, still guaranteeing that all their (delay, bandwidth) requirements are satisfied. For that purpose, we propose an admission control algorithm that enables to decide whether to accept a new GTS allocation request or not, based not only on the remaining time slots, but also on the traffic specifications of the flows, their delay requirements and the available bandwidth resources. We show that our approach improves the bandwidth utilization as compared to the native explicit allocation mechanism defined in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. We also present some practical considerations for the implementation of i-GAME, ensuring backward compatibility with the IEEE 801.5.4 standard with only minor add-ons. Finally, an experimental evaluation on a real system that validates our theoretical analysis and demonstrates the implementation of i-GAME is also presented

Object transportation by multiple mobile robots controlled by attractor dynamics: theory and implementation

Dynamical systems theory is used as a theoretical language and tool to design a distributed control architecture for teams of mobile robots, that must transport a large object and simultaneously avoid collisions with (either static or dynamic) obstacles. Here we demonstrate in simulations and implementations in real robots that it is possible to simplify the architectures presented in previous work and to extend the approach to teams of n robots. The robots have no prior knowledge of the environment. The motion of each robot is controlled by a time series of asymptotical stable states. The attractor dynamics permits the integration of information from various sources in a graded manner. As a result, the robots show a strikingly smooth an stable team behaviour.

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets: An agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

Towards a unified European electricity market: The contribution of data-mining to support realistic simulation studies

Worldwide electricity markets have been evolving into regional and even continental scales. The aim at an efficient use of renewable based generation in places where it exceeds the local needs is one of the main reasons. A reference case of this evolution is the European Electricity Market, where countries are connected, and several regional markets were created, each one grouping several countries, and supporting transactions of huge amounts of electrical energy. The continuous transformations electricity markets have been experiencing over the years create the need to use simulation platforms to support operators, regulators, and involved players for understanding and dealing with this complex environment. This paper focuses on demonstrating the advantage that real electricity markets data has for the creation of realistic simulation scenarios, which allow the study of the impacts and implications that electricity markets transformations will bring to the participant countries. A case study using MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is presented, with a scenario based on real data, simulating the European Electricity Market environment, and comparing its performance when using several different market mechanisms.

Coalition of distributed generation units to Virtual Power Players - a game theory approach

Smart Grids (SGs) have emerged as the new paradigm for power system operation and management, being designed to include large amounts of distributed energy resources. This new paradigm requires new Energy Resource Management (ERM) methodologies considering different operation strategies and the existence of new management players such as several types of aggregators. This paper proposes a methodology to facilitate the coalition between distributed generation units originating Virtual Power Players (VPP) considering a game theory approach. The proposed approach consists in the analysis of the classifications that were attributed by each VPP to the distributed generation units, as well as in the analysis of the previous established contracts by each player. The proposed classification model is based in fourteen parameters including technical, economical and behavioural ones. Depending of the VPP strategies, size and goals, each parameter has different importance. VPP can also manage other type of energy resources, like storage units, electric vehicles, demand response programs or even parts of the MV and LV distribution network. A case study with twelve VPPs with different characteristics and one hundred and fifty real distributed generation units is included in the paper.

Decision Support for Energy Contracts Negotiation with Game Theory and Adaptive Learning

This paper presents a decision support methodology for electricity market players’ bilateral contract negotiations. The proposed model is based on the application of game theory, using artificial intelligence to enhance decision support method’s adaptive features. This model is integrated in AiD-EM (Adaptive Decision Support for Electricity Markets Negotiations), a multi-agent system that provides electricity market players with strategic behavior capabilities to improve their outcomes from energy contracts’ negotiations. Although a diversity of tools that enable the study and simulation of electricity markets has emerged during the past few years, these are mostly directed to the analysis of market models and power systems’ technical constraints, making them suitable tools to support decisions of market operators and regulators. However, the equally important support of market negotiating players’ decisions is being highly neglected. The proposed model contributes to overcome the existing gap concerning effective and realistic decision support for electricity market negotiating entities. The proposed method is validated by realistic electricity market simulations using real data from the Iberian market operator—MIBEL. Results show that the proposed adaptive decision support features enable electricity market players to improve their outcomes from bilateral contracts’ negotiations.

Fiscal decentralisation and economic theory

There is no complete overview or discussion of the literature of the economics of federalism and fiscal decentralization, even though scholarly interest in the topic has been increasing significantly over recent years. This paper provides a general, brief but comprehensive overview of the main insights from the literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization. In doing so, literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization is grouped into two main approaches: “first generation of theories” and “second generation of theories”.