Online versus postal questionnaires: a comparison between two data collection methods

Objectives : The purpose of this article is to find out differences between surveys using paper and online questionnaires. The author has deep knowledge in the case of questions concerning opinions in the development of survey based research, e.g. the limits of postal and online questionnaires. Methods : In the physician studies carried out in 1995 (doctors graduated in 1982-1991), 2000 (doctors graduated in 1982-1996), 2005 (doctors graduated in 1982-2001), 2011 (doctors graduated in 1977-2006) and 457 family doctors in 2000, were used paper and online questionnaires. The response rates were 64%, 68%, 64%, 49% and 73%, respectively. Results : The results of the physician studies showed that there were differences between methods. These differences were connected with using paper-based questionnaire and online questionnaire and response rate. The online-based survey gave a lower response rate than the postal survey. The major advantages of online survey were short response time; very low financial resource needs and data were directly loaded in the data analysis software, thus saved time and resources associated with the data entry process. Conclusions : The current article helps researchers with planning the study design and choosing of the right data collection method.

Privatization and government preference in a public Stackelberg leader duopoly

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue in a Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm.

Privatization and government preferences in a mixed duopoly: Stackelberg versus Cournot

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue, by considering a (sequential) Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm. Furthermore, we compare our results with the ones previously published by an other author obtained in a (simultaneous) Cournot duopoly.

Government preference, environmental taxes and privatization

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for environmental tax revenue. The model that we consider is more general than the one consider in Wang and Wang (2009), in the sense that we put a larger weight in the environment tax revenue than on the other terms of the government's objective function. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.