Social welfare with a foreign competitor

In this paper, we consider a mixed market in which a state-owned welfare-maximizing public (domestic) firm competes against a profit-maximizing private (foreign) firm. We suppose that the domestic firm is less eflScient than the foreign firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of entry of a foreign firm on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare.

Privatization and entry of a foreign firm with demand uncertainty

We investigate the effects of trade with a foreign firm and privatization of the domestic pubUc firm on an incentive for the domestic firm to reduce costs by undertaking R&D investment, under demand uncertainty. We suppose that the domestic firm is less efficient than the foreign firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of entry of a foreign firm, and the effects of demand uncertainty, on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare.

A estruturação dos determinantes relevantes no processo de decisão do investimento direto estrangeiro em Portugal e em Espanha

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças, sob orientação do Dr. Luís Pereira Gomes

Cournot model with investments to change the market size

We present a new deterministic dynamical model on the market size of Cournot competitions, based on Nash equilibria of R&D investment strategies to increase the size of the market of the firms at every period of the game. We compute the unique Nash equilibrium for the second subgame and the profit functions for both firms. Adding uncertainty to the R&D investment strategies, we get a new stochastic dynamical model and we analyse the importance of the uncertainty to reverse the initial advantage of one firm with respect to the other.