Transmission costs allocation based on optimal re-dispatch

Congestion management of transmission power systems has achieve high relevance in competitive environments, which require an adequate approach both in technical and economic terms. This paper proposes a new methodology for congestion management and transmission tariff determination in deregulated electricity markets. The congestion management methodology is based on a reformulated optimal power flow, whose main goal is to obtain a feasible solution for the re-dispatch minimizing the changes in the transactions resulting from market operation. The proposed transmission tariffs consider the physical impact caused by each market agents in the transmission network. The final tariff considers existing system costs and also costs due to the initial congestion situation and losses. This paper includes a case study for the 118 bus IEEE test case.

Bertrand oligopoly when rivals' costs are unknown

We study a Bertrand oligopoly model with incomplete information about rivals' costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game, the ex-ante expected profit and the ex-post profit of each firm. We see that, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknown

We study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian- Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price competition, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Strategic trade policy and signaling costs with differentiated goods

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.