Monetary and fiscal policies interactions in a monetary union with country-size asymmetry

Within a country-size asymmetric monetary union, idiosyncratic shocks and national fiscal stabilization policies cause asymmetric cross-border effects. These effects are a source of strategic interactions between noncoordinated fiscal and monetary policies: on the one hand, due to larger externalities imposed on the union, large countries face less incentives to develop free-riding fiscal policies; on the other hand, a larger strategic position vis-à-vis the central bank incentives the use of fiscal policy to, deliberately, influence monetary policy. Additionally, the existence of non-distortionary government financing may also shape policy interactions. As a result, optimal policy regimes may diverge not only across the union members, but also between the latter and the monetary union. In a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian model for a monetary union, we consider two fiscal policy scenarios: (i) lump-sum taxes are raised to fully finance the government budget and (ii) lump-sum taxes do not ensure balanced budgets in each period; therefore, fiscal and monetary policies are expected to impinge on debt sustainability. For several degrees of country-size asymmetry, we compute optimal discretionary and dynamic non-cooperative policy games and compare their stabilization performance using a union-wide welfare measure. We also assess whether these outcomes could be improved, for the monetary union, through institutional policy arrangements. We find that, in the presence of government indebtedness, monetary policy optimally deviates from macroeconomic to debt stabilization. We also find that policy cooperation is always welfare increasing for the monetary union as a whole; however, indebted large countries may strongly oppose to this arrangement in favour of fiscal leadership. In this case, delegation of monetary policy to a conservative central bank proves to be fruitful to improve the union’s welfare.

The Interactions between clients and providers of services related to marketing activities

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the business interactions involved in the purchase of services related to marketing activities. We build on the literature about business services classifications and the interaction between clients and providers of business services. An empirical study is conducted by means of a survey questionnaire. Data were collected from a sample of 80 buying firms of services related to marketing activities who agreed to cooperate and represent medium and large Portuguese’s firms. The results show that the buying of services related to marketing activities involves both the client and the provider in the interaction process. This paper contributes to understanding the interaction process of buying services related to marketing activities in terms of the parties involved, product/service exchange, financial and information exchange. Providers of services related to marketing activities can expect stable and preferred relationships if they can offer a good price and quality of service, meet the agreed deadlines and respond quickly to client orders. On the client’s side, the relevance, the characteristics and the wide diversity of services related to marketing activities requires a good understanding and management of the interaction portfolio with providers.