A gestão de riscos de negócio e o seu reporte

Dissertação de Mestrado Apresentada ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Auditoria, sob orientação do Mestre Carlos Mendes.

Government preference, environmental taxes and privatization

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for environmental tax revenue. The model that we consider is more general than the one consider in Wang and Wang (2009), in the sense that we put a larger weight in the environment tax revenue than on the other terms of the government's objective function. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.

Privatization and social welfare in an international mixed Stackelberg duopoly

Competition between public and private firms exists in a range of industries like telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, airlines industries, as weel as services including hospitals, banking and education. Some authors studied mixed oligopolies under Cournot competition (firms move simultaneously) and some others considered Stackelberg models (firms move sequentially). Tomaru [1] analyzed, in a Cournot model, how decision-making upon cost-reducing R&D investment by a domestic public firm is affected by privatization when competing in the domestic market with a foreign firm. He shows that privatization of the domestic public firm lowers productive efficiency and deteriorates domestic social welfare. In this paper, we examine the same question but in a Stackelberg formulation instead of Cournot. The model is a three-stage game. In the first stage, the domestic firm chooses the amount of cost-reducing R&D investment. Then, the firms compete à la Stackelberg. Two cases are considered: (i) The domestic firm is the leader; (ii) The foreign firm is the leader. We show that the results obtained in [1] for Cournot competition are robust in the sence that they are also true when firms move sequentially.

Privatização num mercado misto com decisões sequenciais

Consideramos um mercado no qual competem uma empresa pública e uma empresa privada, decidindo, de forma sequencial, as quantidades a produzir. O governo impõe um imposto sobre as quantidades comercializadas, de acordo com uma função que consiste numa soma ponderada entre o bem-estar público e a receita total obtida pela aplicação desse imposto. O objetivo deste trabalho é estudar o efeito da privatização da empresa pública, (i) quando a empresa líder é a empresa pública; e (ii) quando a empresa líder é a empresa privada. Além disso, fazemos uma comparação entre os resultados obtidos nos dois modelos estudados.

Stackelberg leadership with demand uncertainty in a differentiated duopoly

On a symmetric differentiated Stackelberg duopoly model in which there is asymmetric demand information owned by leading and follower firms, we show that the leading firm does not necessarily have advantage over the following one. The reason for this is that the second mover can adjust its output level after observing the realized demand, while the first mover chooses its output level only with the knowledge of demand distribution.

Welfare effects of entry into international markets with licensing

We study the effects of entry of a foreign firm on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the entrant is technologically inferior to the incumbent. We show that foreign entry increases domestic welfare for intermediate (respectively, sufficiently large) technological differences between the firms under licensing with fixed fee (respectively, output royalty).

Equilibria of quantity setting differentiated duopoly with uncertainty

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods and with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the output levels of their products according to the well-known concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. There is a firm ( F1 ) that chooses first the quantity 1 q of its good; the other firm ( F2 ) observes 1 q and then chooses the quantity 2 q of its good. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with the highest production cost versus the one with the cheapest cost.

Quantity-setting competition under uncertain demand

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly model, and we study the decision to move first or second, by assuming that. the firms produce homogeneous goods and that. there is some demand uncertainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods, and in either period, the firms can make a production decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they make the decision, we study the circumstances that favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.

New and low cost plastic membrane electrode with low detection limits for sulfadimethoxine determination in aquaculture waters

Sulfadimethoxine (SDM) is one of the drugs, often used in the aquaculture sector to prevent the spread of disease in freshwater fish aquaculture. Its spread through the soil and surface water can contribute to an increase in bacterial resistance. It is therefore important to control this product in the environment. This work proposes a simple and low-cost potentiometric device to monitor the levels of SDM in aquaculture waters, thus avoiding its unnecessary release throughout the environment. The device combines a micropipette tip with a PVC membrane selective to SDM, prepared from an appropriate cocktail, and an inner reference solution. The membrane includes 1% of a porphyrin derivative acting as ionophore and a small amount of a lipophilic cationic additive (corresponding to 0.2% in molar ratio). The composition of the inner solution was optimized with regard to the kind and/or concentration of primary ion, chelating agent and/or a specific interfering charged species, in different concentration ranges. Electrodes constructed with inner reference solutions of 1 × 10−8 mol/L SDM and 1 × 10−4 mol/L chromate ion showed the best analytical features. Near-Nernstian response was obtained with slopes of −54.1 mV/decade, an extraordinary detection limit of 7.5 ng/mL (2.4 × 10−8 mol/L) when compared with other electrodes of the same type. The reproducibility, stability and response time are good and even better than those obtained by liquid contact ISEs. Recovery values of 98.9% were obtained from the analysis of aquaculture water samples.