Remuneration Structure Definition for Distributed Generation Units and Demand Response Participants Aggregation

The implementation of competitive electricity markets has changed the consumers’ and distributed generation position power systems operation. The use of distributed generation and the participation in demand response programs, namely in smart grids, bring several advantages for consumers, aggregators, and system operators. The present paper proposes a remuneration structure for aggregated distributed generation and demand response resources. A virtual power player aggregates all the resources. The resources are aggregated in a certain number of clusters, each one corresponding to a distinct tariff group, according to the economic impact of the resulting remuneration tariff. The determined tariffs are intended to be used for several months. The aggregator can define the periodicity of the tariffs definition. The case study in this paper includes 218 consumers, and 66 distributed generation units.

Optimization of Generation and Aggregated Consumption Shifting for Demand Response Programs Definition

The concept of demand response has drawing attention to the active participation in the economic operation of power systems, namely in the context of recent electricity markets and smart grid models and implementations. In these competitive contexts, aggregators are necessary in order to make possible the participation of small size consumers and generation units. The methodology proposed in the present paper aims to address the demand shifting between periods, considering multi-period demand response events. The focus is given to the impact in the subsequent periods. A Virtual Power Player operates the network, aggregating the available resources, and minimizing the operation costs. The illustrative case study included is based on a scenario of 218 consumers including generation sources.

Real-Time Simulation of Real-Time Pricing Demand Response to Meet Wind Variations

Recent changes of paradigm in power systems opened the opportunity to the active participation of new players. The small and medium players gain new opportunities while participating in demand response programs. This paper explores the optimal resources scheduling in two distinct levels. First, the network operator facing large wind power variations makes use of real time pricing to induce consumers to meet wind power variations. Then, at the consumer level, each load is managed according to the consumer preferences. The two-level resources schedule has been implemented in a real-time simulation platform, which uses hardware for consumer’ loads control. The illustrative example includes a situation of large lack of wind power and focuses on a consumer with 18 loads.

Consumption Management of Air Conditioning Devices for the Participation in Demand Response Programs

Demand Response has been taking over the years an extreme importance. There’s a lot of demand response programs, one of them proposed in this paper, using air conditioners that could increase the power quality and decrease the spent money in many ways like: infrastructures and customers energy bill reduction. This paper proposes a method and a study on how air conditioners could integrate demand response programs. The proposed method has been modelled as an energy resources management optimization problem. This paper presents two case studies, the first one with all costumers participating and second one with some of costumers. The results obtained for both case studies have been analyzed.

Electricity markets modeling considering complex contracts and aggregators

All over the world, the liberalization of electricity markets, which follows different paradigms, has created new challenges for those involved in this sector. In order to respond to these challenges, electric power systems suffered a significant restructuring in its mode of operation and planning. This restructuring resulted in a considerable increase of the electric sector competitiveness. Particularly, the Ancillary Services (AS) market has been target of constant renovations in its operation mode as it is a targeted market for the trading of services, which have as main objective to ensure the operation of electric power systems with appropriate levels of stability, safety, quality, equity and competitiveness. In this way, with the increasing penetration of distributed energy resources including distributed generation, demand response, storage units and electric vehicles, it is essential to develop new smarter and hierarchical methods of operation of electric power systems. As these resources are mostly connected to the distribution network, it is important to consider the introduction of this kind of resources in AS delivery in order to achieve greater reliability and cost efficiency of electrical power systems operation. The main contribution of this work is the design and development of mechanisms and methodologies of AS market and for energy and AS joint market, considering different management entities of transmission and distribution networks. Several models developed in this work consider the most common AS in the liberalized market environment: Regulation Down; Regulation Up; Spinning Reserve and Non-Spinning Reserve. The presented models consider different rules and ways of operation, such as the division of market by network areas, which allows the congestion management of interconnections between areas; or the ancillary service cascading process, which allows the replacement of AS of superior quality by lower quality of AS, ensuring a better economic performance of the market. A major contribution of this work is the development an innovative methodology of market clearing process to be used in the energy and AS joint market, able to ensure viable and feasible solutions in markets, where there are technical constraints in the transmission network involving its division into areas or regions. The proposed method is based on the determination of Bialek topological factors and considers the contribution of the dispatch for all services of increase of generation (energy, Regulation Up, Spinning and Non-Spinning reserves) in network congestion. The use of Bialek factors in each iteration of the proposed methodology allows limiting the bids in the market while ensuring that the solution is feasible in any context of system operation. Another important contribution of this work is the model of the contribution of distributed energy resources in the ancillary services. In this way, a Virtual Power Player (VPP) is considered in order to aggregate, manage and interact with distributed energy resources. The VPP manages all the agents aggregated, being able to supply AS to the system operator, with the main purpose of participation in electricity market. In order to ensure their participation in the AS, the VPP should have a set of contracts with the agents that include a set of diversified and adapted rules to each kind of distributed resource. All methodologies developed and implemented in this work have been integrated into the MASCEM simulator, which is a simulator based on a multi-agent system that allows to study complex operation of electricity markets. In this way, the developed methodologies allow the simulator to cover more operation contexts of the present and future of the electricity market. In this way, this dissertation offers a huge contribution to the AS market simulation, based on models and mechanisms currently used in several real markets, as well as the introduction of innovative methodologies of market clearing process on the energy and AS joint market. This dissertation presents five case studies; each one consists of multiple scenarios. The first case study illustrates the application of AS market simulation considering several bids of market players. The energy and ancillary services joint market simulation is exposed in the second case study. In the third case study it is developed a comparison between the simulation of the joint market methodology, in which the player bids to the ancillary services is considered by network areas and a reference methodology. The fourth case study presents the simulation of joint market methodology based on Bialek topological distribution factors applied to transmission network with 7 buses managed by a TSO. The last case study presents a joint market model simulation which considers the aggregation of small players to a VPP, as well as complex contracts related to these entities. The case study comprises a distribution network with 33 buses managed by VPP, which comprises several kinds of distributed resources, such as photovoltaic, CHP, fuel cells, wind turbines, biomass, small hydro, municipal solid waste, demand response, and storage units.

Stackelberg leadership with demand uncertainty in a differentiated duopoly

On a symmetric differentiated Stackelberg duopoly model in which there is asymmetric demand information owned by leading and follower firms, we show that the leading firm does not necessarily have advantage over the following one. The reason for this is that the second mover can adjust its output level after observing the realized demand, while the first mover chooses its output level only with the knowledge of demand distribution.

Quantity-setting competition under uncertain demand

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly model, and we study the decision to move first or second, by assuming that. the firms produce homogeneous goods and that. there is some demand uncertainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods, and in either period, the firms can make a production decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they make the decision, we study the circumstances that favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.

Stackelberg duopoly with demand uncertainty

We consider a symmetric Stackelberg model in which there is asymmetric demand information owned by first and second movers. We analyse the advantages of leadership and flexibility, and prove that when the leading firm faces demand uncertainty, but the follower does not, the first mover does not necessarily have advantage over the second mover. Moreover, we show that the advantage of one firm over the other depends upon the demand fluctuation and also upon the degree of substitutability of the products.

Flexibility and leadership advantages in a model with uncertain demand

We consider a differentiated Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty only for the first mover. We study the advantages of flexibility over leadership as the degree of the differentiation of the goods changes.

A multi-objective model for scheduling of short-term incentive-based demand response programs offered by electricity retailers

In this paper, we formulate the electricity retailers’ short-term decision-making problem in a liberalized retail market as a multi-objective optimization model. Retailers with light physical assets, such as generation and storage units in the distribution network, are considered. Following advances in smart grid technologies, electricity retailers are becoming able to employ incentive-based demand response (DR) programs in addition to their physical assets to effectively manage the risks of market price and load variations. In this model, the DR scheduling is performed simultaneously with the dispatch of generation and storage units. The ultimate goal is to find the optimal values of the hourly financial incentives offered to the end-users. The proposed model considers the capacity obligations imposed on retailers by the grid operator. The profit seeking retailer also has the objective to minimize the peak demand to avoid the high capacity charges in form of grid tariffs or penalties. The non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm II (NSGA-II) is used to solve the multi-objective problem. It is a fast and elitist multi-objective evolutionary algorithm. A case study is solved to illustrate the efficient performance of the proposed methodology. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the model for designing the incentive-based DR programs and indicate the efficiency of NSGA-II in solving the retailers’ multi-objective problem.