Remuneration Structure Definition for Distributed Generation Units and Demand Response Participants Aggregation

The implementation of competitive electricity markets has changed the consumers’ and distributed generation position power systems operation. The use of distributed generation and the participation in demand response programs, namely in smart grids, bring several advantages for consumers, aggregators, and system operators. The present paper proposes a remuneration structure for aggregated distributed generation and demand response resources. A virtual power player aggregates all the resources. The resources are aggregated in a certain number of clusters, each one corresponding to a distinct tariff group, according to the economic impact of the resulting remuneration tariff. The determined tariffs are intended to be used for several months. The aggregator can define the periodicity of the tariffs definition. The case study in this paper includes 218 consumers, and 66 distributed generation units.

Optimization of Generation and Aggregated Consumption Shifting for Demand Response Programs Definition

The concept of demand response has drawing attention to the active participation in the economic operation of power systems, namely in the context of recent electricity markets and smart grid models and implementations. In these competitive contexts, aggregators are necessary in order to make possible the participation of small size consumers and generation units. The methodology proposed in the present paper aims to address the demand shifting between periods, considering multi-period demand response events. The focus is given to the impact in the subsequent periods. A Virtual Power Player operates the network, aggregating the available resources, and minimizing the operation costs. The illustrative case study included is based on a scenario of 218 consumers including generation sources.

Real-Time Simulation of Real-Time Pricing Demand Response to Meet Wind Variations

Recent changes of paradigm in power systems opened the opportunity to the active participation of new players. The small and medium players gain new opportunities while participating in demand response programs. This paper explores the optimal resources scheduling in two distinct levels. First, the network operator facing large wind power variations makes use of real time pricing to induce consumers to meet wind power variations. Then, at the consumer level, each load is managed according to the consumer preferences. The two-level resources schedule has been implemented in a real-time simulation platform, which uses hardware for consumer’ loads control. The illustrative example includes a situation of large lack of wind power and focuses on a consumer with 18 loads.

Stackelberg duopoly with demand uncertainty

We consider a symmetric Stackelberg model in which there is asymmetric demand information owned by first and second movers. We analyse the advantages of leadership and flexibility, and prove that when the leading firm faces demand uncertainty, but the follower does not, the first mover does not necessarily have advantage over the second mover. Moreover, we show that the advantage of one firm over the other depends upon the demand fluctuation and also upon the degree of substitutability of the products.

Flexibility and leadership advantages in a model with uncertain demand

We consider a differentiated Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty only for the first mover. We study the advantages of flexibility over leadership as the degree of the differentiation of the goods changes.