What drives corporate default risk premia? Evidence from the CDS market

This paper studies the evolution of the default risk premia for European firms during the years surrounding the recent credit crisis. We employ the information embedded in Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and Moody’s KMV EDF default probabilities to analyze the common factors driving this risk premia. The risk premium is characterized in several directions: Firstly, we perform a panel data analysis to capture the relationship between CDS spreads and actual default probabilities. Secondly, we employ the intensity framework of Jarrow et al. (2005) in order to measure the theoretical effect of risk premium on expected bond returns. Thirdly, we carry out a dynamic panel data to identify the macroeconomic sources of risk premium. Finally, a vector autoregressive model analyzes which proportion of the co-movement is attributable to financial or macro variables. Our estimations report coefficients for risk premium substantially higher than previously referred for US firms and a time varying behavior. A dominant factor explains around 60% of the common movements in risk premia. Additionally, empirical evidence suggests a public-to-private risk transfer between the sovereign CDS spreads and corporate risk premia.

Constructing good deals in discrete time arbitrage-free dynamic pricing models

Recent literature has proved that many classical pricing models (Black and Scholes, Heston, etc.) and risk measures (V aR, CV aR, etc.) may lead to “pathological meaningless situations”, since traders can build sequences of portfolios whose risk leveltends to −infinity and whose expected return tends to +infinity, i.e., (risk = −infinity, return = +infinity). Such a sequence of strategies may be called “good deal”. This paper focuses on the risk measures V aR and CV aR and analyzes this caveat in a discrete time complete pricing model. Under quite general conditions the explicit expression of a good deal is given, and its sensitivity with respect to some possible measurement errors is provided too. We point out that a critical property is the absence of short sales. In such a case we first construct a “shadow riskless asset” (SRA) without short sales and then the good deal is given by borrowing more and more money so as to invest in the SRA. It is also shown that the SRA is interested by itself, even if there are short selling restrictions.