Use of Performance Measurement in the Public Sector: the case of the police service

Many public organisations have been under great pressure in recent years to increase the efficiency and transparency of outputs, to rationalise the use of public resources, and to increase the quality of service delivery. In this context, public organisations were encouraged to introduce the New Public Management reforms with the goal of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the performance organisation through a new public management model. This new public management model is based on measurement by outputs and outcomes, a clear definition of responsibilities, the transparency and accountability of governmental activities, and on a greater value for citizens. What type of performance measurement systems are used in police services? Based on the literature, we see that multidimensional models, such as the Balanced Scorecard, are important in many public organisations, like municipalities, universities, and hospitals. Police services are characterised by complex, diverse objectives and stakeholders. Therefore, performance measurement of these public services calls for a specific analysis. Based on a nationwide survey of all police chiefs of the Portuguese police force, we find that employee performance measurement is the main form of measurement. Also, we propose a strategic map for the Portuguese police service.

Performance measurement and management in Portuguese law enforcement

Performance measurement of police services is complicated by ambiguous and complex goal- and objectives-setting, and by the difficulties of measuring outputs. This article looks at the organizational and management changes being made in Portuguese police forces. The authors fill a gap in the literature on performance measurement in Portugal by taking a national approach to the study of how law enforcement agencies are introducing new management accounting changes. The article therefore widens the debate on performance measurement and performance improvements in law enforcement.

Agencification in Latin countries: Portugal

This chapter provides a broad look at the Portuguese process of agencification in the last two decades. As with most of the remaining chapters in this book, we cover the basics by describing the administrative landscape, its changes in organizational make-up, the delicate balance between control and autonomy in the ministry-agency relationship, perceptual changes in efficiency and performance measurement in public management, based on a comprehensive survey (COBRA survey of the CRIPO research group) sent to all public-sector organizations under public law with some degree of autonomy (see Chapter 1, Table 1.1). Portugal is undergoing the most pervasive politico-economic crisis in its short democratic history. The administrative mapping conducted in 2007 which served as the basis for the administration of the COBRA survey is already undergoing change.

Determinants of the Design and Use of PMS in Portuguese Government Agencies: A Complementary Theoretical Approach

Performance measurement is seen as a main pillar of public management reforms. However, prior research did not mitigate the level of ambiguity on PMS development and use and many questions left unanswered. Our findings provide knowledge on the design and use of PMS in the public sector answer- ing to calls for a complementary approach among institutional and contingency factors. The authors find that the design of PMS and the use of performance information for external purposes are increased to legitimate the organizational’ work and to obtain external support. Moreover, structural variables such as type of agency and management autonomy are also determinants on the organizational responses. Finally, the authors find some coupling between the design of PMS and outcomes. So, both contingent and institutional approaches play an important role on the empirical model.

Performance management framework: the fit between PM framework adopted in Portuguese local government and the Otley’s framework

Purpose/objectives: This paper seeks to investigate whether performance management (PM) framework adopted in Portuguese local government (PLG) fit the Otley’s PM framework (1999). In particularly, the research questions are (1) whether PM framework adopted in PLG (SIADAP) fit the Otley´s framework, and (2) how local politicians (aldermen) see the operation of performance management systems (PMS) in PLG (focusing on the goal-setting process and incentive and reward structures). Theoretical positioning/contributions: With this paper we intend to contribute to literature on how the Otley’s PM framework can guide empirical research about the operation of PMS. In particular, the paper contributes to understand the fit between PMS implemented in PLG and the Otley´s PM framework. The analysis of this fit can be a good contribution to understand if PMS are used in PLG as a management tool or as a strategic response to external pressures (based on interviews conducted to aldermen). We believe that the Otley’s PM framework, as well as the extended PM framework presented by Ferreira and Otley (2009), can provide a useful research tool to understand the operation of PMS in PLG. Research method: The first research question is the central issue in this paper and is analyzed based on the main reforms introduced by Portuguese government on PM of public organizations (like municipalities). On the other hand, interviews conducted on three larger Portuguese municipalities (Oporto, Braga, and Matosinhos) show how aldermen see the operation of PMS in PLG, highlighting the goals setting process with targets associated and the existing of incentive and reward structures linked with performance. Findings: Generally we find that formal and regulated PM frameworks in PLG fit the main issues of the Otley’s PM framework. However, regarding the aldermen perceptions about PMS in practice we find a gap between theory and practice, especially regarding difficulties associated with the lack of a culture of goals and targets setting and the lack of incentive and reward structures linked with performance.