Criminal Liability of Organizations, Corporations, Legal Persons, and Similar Entities on Law of Portuguese Cybercrime: A Brief Discussion on the Issue of Crimes of “False Information,” the “Damage on Other Programs or Computer Data,” the “Computer-Software Sabotage,” the “Illegitimate Access,” the “Unlawful Interception,” and “Illegitimate Reproduction of the Protected Program”

Abstract: in Portugal, and in much of the legal systems of Europe, «legal persons» are likely to be criminally responsibilities also for cybercrimes. Like for example the following crimes: «false information»; «damage on other programs or computer data»; «computer-software sabotage»; «illegitimate access»; «unlawful interception» and «illegitimate reproduction of protected program». However, in Portugal, have many exceptions. Exceptions to the «question of criminal liability» of «legal persons». Some «legal persons» can not be blamed for cybercrime. The legislature did not leave! These «legal persons» are v.g. the following («public entities»): legal persons under public law, which include the public business entities; entities utilities, regardless of ownership; or other legal persons exercising public powers. In other words, and again as an example, a Portuguese public university or a private concessionaire of a public service in Portugal, can not commit (in Portugal) any one of cybercrime pointed. Fair? Unfair. All laws should provide that all legal persons can commit cybercrimes. PS: resumo do artigo em inglês.

COORDINSPECTOR: a tool for extracting coordination data from legacy code

More and more current software systems rely on non trivial coordination logic for combining autonomous services typically running on different platforms and often owned by different organizations. Often, however, coordination data is deeply entangled in the code and, therefore, difficult to isolate and analyse separately. COORDINSPECTOR is a software tool which combines slicing and program analysis techniques to isolate all coordination elements from the source code of an existing application. Such a reverse engineering process provides a clear view of the actually invoked services as well as of the orchestration patterns which bind them together. The tool analyses Common Intermediate Language (CIL) code, the native language of Microsoft .Net Framework. Therefore, the scope of application of COORDINSPECTOR is quite large: potentially any piece of code developed in any of the programming languages which compiles to the .Net Framework. The tool generates graphical representations of the coordination layer together and identifies the underlying business process orchestrations, rendering them as Orc specifications

The role of coordination analysis in software integration projects

What sort of component coordination strategies emerge in a software integration process? How can such strategies be discovered and further analysed? How close are they to the coordination component of the envisaged architectural model which was supposed to guide the integration process? This paper introduces a framework in which such questions can be discussed and illustrates its use by describing part of a real case-study. The approach is based on a methodology which enables semi-automatic discovery of coordination patterns from source code, combining generalized slicing techniques and graph manipulation