Opinion dynamics of learning agents: does seeking consensus lead to disagreement?

We study opinion dynamics in a population of interacting adaptive agents voting on a set of issues represented by vectors. We consider agents who can classify issues into one of two categories and can arrive at their opinions using an adaptive algorithm. Adaptation comes from learning and the information for the learning process comes from interacting with other neighboring agents and trying to change the internal state in order to concur with their opinions. The change in the internal state is driven by the information contained in the issue and in the opinion of the other agent. We present results in a simple yet rich context where each agent uses a Boolean perceptron to state their opinion. If the update occurs with information asynchronously exchanged among pairs of agents, then the typical case, if the number of issues is kept small, is the evolution into a society torn by the emergence of factions with extreme opposite beliefs. This occurs even when seeking consensus with agents with opposite opinions. If the number of issues is large, the dynamics becomes trapped, the society does not evolve into factions and a distribution of moderate opinions is observed. The synchronous case is technically simpler and is studied by formulating the problem in terms of differential equations that describe the evolution of order parameters that measure the consensus between pairs of agents. We show that for a large number of issues and unidirectional information flow, global consensus is a fixed point; however, the approach to this consensus is glassy for large societies.

The mass media destabilizes the cultural homogenous regime in Axelrod`s model

An important feature of Axelrod`s model for culture dissemination or social influence is the emergence of many multicultural absorbing states, despite the fact that the local rules that specify the agents interactions are explicitly designed to decrease the cultural differences between agents. Here we re-examine the problem of introducing an external, global interaction-the mass media-in the rules of Axelrod`s model: in addition to their nearest neighbors, each agent has a certain probability p to interact with a virtual neighbor whose cultural features are fixed from the outset. Most surprisingly, this apparently homogenizing effect actually increases the cultural diversity of the population. We show that, contrary to previous claims in the literature, even a vanishingly small value of p is sufficient to destabilize the homogeneous regime for very large lattice sizes.