Qualitative assessment of stock prices listed on the Sao Paulo stock exchange: An approach from the perspective of homogeneity analysis

The stock market suffers uncertain relations throughout the entire negotiation process, with different variables exerting direct and indirect influence on stock prices. This study focuses on the analysis of certain aspects that may influence these values offered by the capital market, based on the Brazil Index of the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa), which selects 100 stocks among the most traded on Bovespa in terms of number of trades and financial volume. The selected variables are characterized by the companies` activity area and the business volume in the month of data collection, i.e. April/2007. This article proposes an analysis that joins the accounting view of the stock price variables that can be influenced with the use of multivariate qualitative data analysis. Data were explored through Correspondence Analysis (Anacor) and Homogeneity Analysis (Homals). According to the research, the selected variables are associated with the values presented by the stocks, which become an internal control instrument and a decision-making tool when it comes to choosing investments.

Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game

Starting with an initial price vector, prices are adjusted in order to eliminate the excess demand and at the same time to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which set of sellers should those transfers be made is the key issue in the description of the algorithm. We assume additively separable utilities and introduce a novel distinction by considering multiple sellers owing multiple identical objects and multiple buyers with an exogenously defined quota, consuming more than one object but at most one unit of a seller`s good and having multi-dimensional payoffs. This distinction induces a necessarily more complicated construction of the over-demanded sets than the constructions of these sets for the other assignment games. For this approach, our mechanism yields the buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium payoff, which equals the buyer-optimal stable payoff. The symmetry of the model allows to getting the seller-optimal stable payoff and the seller-optimal competitive equilibrium payoff can then be also derived.