SZNAJD MODEL AND PROPORTIONAL ELECTIONS: THE ROLE OF THE TOPOLOGY OF THE NETWORK

The Sznajd model (SM) has been employed with success in the last years to describe opinion propagation in a community. In particular, it has been claimed that its transient is able to reproduce some scale properties observed in data of proportional elections, in different countries, if the community structure (the network) is scale-free. In this work, we investigate the properties of the transient of a particular version of the SM, introduced by Bernardes and co-authors in 2002. We studied the behavior of the model in networks of different topologies through the time evolution of an order parameter known as interface density, and concluded that regular lattices with high dimensionality also leads to a power-law distribution of the number of candidates with v votes. Also, we show that the particular absorbing state achieved in the stationary state (or else, the winner candidate), is related to a particular feature of the model, that may not be realistic in all situations.

Generalized Sznajd model for opinion propagation

In the last decade the Sznajd model has been successfully employed in modeling some properties and scale features of both proportional and majority elections. We propose a version of the Sznajd model with a generalized bounded confidence rule-a rule that limits the convincing capability of agents and that is essential to allow coexistence of opinions in the stationary state. With an appropriate choice of parameters it can be reduced to previous models. We solved this model both in a mean-field approach (for an arbitrary number of opinions) and numerically in a Barabaacutesi-Albert network (for three and four opinions), studying the transient and the possible stationary states. We built the phase portrait for the special cases of three and four opinions, defining the attractors and their basins of attraction. Through this analysis, we were able to understand and explain discrepancies between mean-field and simulation results obtained in previous works for the usual Sznajd model with bounded confidence and three opinions. Both the dynamical system approach and our generalized bounded confidence rule are quite general and we think it can be useful to the understanding of other similar models.

Coexistence of interacting opinions in a generalized Sznajd model

The Sznajd model is a sociophysics model that mimics the propagation of opinions in a closed society, where the interactions favor groups of agreeing people. It is based in the Ising and Potts ferromagnetic models and, although the original model used only linear chains, it has since been adapted to general networks. This model has a very rich transient, which has been used to model several aspects of elections, but its stationary states are always consensus states. In order to model more complex behaviors, we have, in a recent work, introduced the idea of biases and prejudices to the Sznajd model by generalizing the bounded confidence rule, which is common to many continuous opinion models, to what we called confidence rules. In that work we have found that the mean field version of this model (corresponding to a complete network) allows for stationary states where noninteracting opinions survive, but never for the coexistence of interacting opinions. In the present work, we provide networks that allow for the coexistence of interacting opinions for certain confidence rules. Moreover, we show that the model does not become inactive; that is, the opinions keep changing, even in the stationary regime. This is an important result in the context of understanding how a rule that breeds local conformity is still able to sustain global diversity while avoiding a frozen stationary state. We also provide results that give some insights on how this behavior approaches the mean field behavior as the networks are changed.

Definindo a arena política local: sistemas partidários municipais na federação brasileira

This article analyzes the Brazilian political system from the local perspective. Following Cox (1997), we review the problems with electoral coordination that emerge from a given institutional framework. Due to the characteristics of the Brazilian Federal system and its electoral rules, linkage between the three levels of government is not guaranteed a priori, but demands a coordinating effort by the parties' leadership. According to our hypothesis, the parties are capable of coordinating their election strategies at different levels in the party system. Regression models based on two-stage least squares (2SLS) and TOBIT, analyzing a panel of Brazilian municipalities with data from the 1994 and 2000 elections, show that the proportion of votes received by a party in a given election correlates closely with its previous votes in majoritarian elections. Despite institutional incentives, the Brazilian party system shows evidence that it is organized nationally to the extent that it links the competition for votes at the three levels of government (National, State, and Municipal).

THE IMPORTANCE OF DISAGREEING: CONTRARIANS AND EXTREMISM IN THE CODA MODEL

In this paper, we study the effects of introducing contrarians in a model of Opinion Dynamics where the agents have internal continuous opinions, but exchange information only about a binary choice that is a function of their continuous opinion, the CODA model. We observe that the hung election scenario that arises when contrarians are introduced in discrete opinion models still happens. However, it is weaker and it should not be expected in every election. Finally, we also show that the introduction of contrarians make the tendency towards extremism of the original model weaker, indicating that the existence of agents that prefer to disagree might be an important aspect and help society to diminish extremist opinions.

Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities

This paper uses a new panel of more than 2,000 Brazilian municipalities over 13 years to analyze the influence of public expenditures on the probability of mayors` reelection. We examine Brazilian municipal elections from 1988 to 2000 using a logit fixed-effects model. The results suggest that mayors who spend more during their terms of office increase the probability of their own reelection or of a successor of the same political party. In particular, higher capital spending over the years preceding elections and current expenditures in election years are beneficial to Brazilian incumbent mayors.