Do Terrestrial Tank Bromeliads in Brazil Create Safe Sites for Palm Establishment or Act as Natural Traps for Its Dispersed Seeds ?

This study shows for the first time that terrestrial tank bromeliads from Brazilian restinga can act as natural traps for dispersed palm Euterpe edulis seeds. Such bromeliads, which are shade intolerant, gain benefits by limiting palm recruitment since they hinder canopy formation and, consequently, increase luminosity over its aggregates.

OCCURRENCE AND ANTIBIOTIC SENSIBILITY PROFILE OF Salmonella spp. ISOLATED FROM PORK MEAT CUTS COMMERCIALIZED IN THE OPEN MARKETS IN PELOTAS, RS (BRAZIL)

The objective of the present study was to evaluate the occurrence of Salmonella spp. in 15 samples of pork meat cuts (T-bone, shank, sausage and ribs) commercialized in open markets of Pelotas (RS, Brazil) and verify the prevalent serovars, and test the isolates profile of sensitivity to several antibiotics of importance in medicine (nalidixic acid, ampicillin, aztreonam, kanamycin, carbenicillin, cephalothin, cefoxitin, ceftriaxone, ciprofloxacin, chloramphenicol, gentamicin, sulfonamide, tetracycline and trimetoprina). Twelve samples (80%) were contaminated by Salmonella enterica, serovars Infantis, Derby, Panama and Typhimurium. All isolates were susceptible to trimetoprin, aztreonam, ciprofloxacin, ceftriaxone and cefoxitin. For the other antibiotics, the pattern of sensitivity varied as serovar. In addition, 39.1% of isolates showed up to be multiresistant.

The pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences

In a decentralized setting the game-theoretical predictions are that only strong blockings are allowed to rupture the structure of a matching. This paper argues that, under indifferences, also weak blockings should be considered when these blockings come from the grand coalition. This solution concept requires stability plus Pareto optimality. A characterization of the set of Pareto-stable matchings for the roommate and the marriage models is provided in terms of individually rational matchings whose blocking pairs, if any, are formed with unmatched agents. These matchings always exist and give an economic intuition on how blocking can be done by non-trading agents, so that the transactions need not be undone as agents reach the set of stable matchings. Some properties of the Pareto-stable matchings shared by the Marriage and Roommate models are obtained.