3 resultados para Political of security
em Biblioteca Digital da Produção Intelectual da Universidade de São Paulo (BDPI/USP)
Resumo:
Security administrators face the challenge of designing, deploying and maintaining a variety of configuration files related to security systems, especially in large-scale networks. These files have heterogeneous syntaxes and follow differing semantic concepts. Nevertheless, they are interdependent due to security services having to cooperate and their configuration to be consistent with each other, so that global security policies are completely and correctly enforced. To tackle this problem, our approach supports a comfortable definition of an abstract high-level security policy and provides an automated derivation of the desired configuration files. It is an extension of policy-based management and policy hierarchies, combining model-based management (MBM) with system modularization. MBM employs an object-oriented model of the managed system to obtain the details needed for automated policy refinement. The modularization into abstract subsystems (ASs) segment the system-and the model-into units which more closely encapsulate related system components and provide focused abstract views. As a result, scalability is achieved and even comprehensive IT systems can be modelled in a unified manner. The associated tool MoBaSeC (Model-Based-Service-Configuration) supports interactive graphical modelling, automated model analysis and policy refinement with the derivation of configuration files. We describe the MBM and AS approaches, outline the tool functions and exemplify their applications and results obtained. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Resumo:
Policy hierarchies and automated policy refinement are powerful approaches to simplify administration of security services in complex network environments. A crucial issue for the practical use of these approaches is to ensure the validity of the policy hierarchy, i.e. since the policy sets for the lower levels are automatically derived from the abstract policies (defined by the modeller), we must be sure that the derived policies uphold the high-level ones. This paper builds upon previous work on Model-based Management, particularly on the Diagram of Abstract Subsystems approach, and goes further to propose a formal validation approach for the policy hierarchies yielded by the automated policy refinement process. We establish general validation conditions for a multi-layered policy model, i.e. necessary and sufficient conditions that a policy hierarchy must satisfy so that the lower-level policy sets are valid refinements of the higher-level policies according to the criteria of consistency and completeness. Relying upon the validation conditions and upon axioms about the model representativeness, two theorems are proved to ensure compliance between the resulting system behaviour and the abstract policies that are modelled.
Resumo:
A novel cryptography method based on the Lorenz`s attractor chaotic system is presented. The proposed algorithm is secure and fast, making it practical for general use. We introduce the chaotic operation mode, which provides an interaction among the password, message and a chaotic system. It ensures that the algorithm yields a secure codification, even if the nature of the chaotic system is known. The algorithm has been implemented in two versions: one sequential and slow and the other, parallel and fast. Our algorithm assures the integrity of the ciphertext (we know if it has been altered, which is not assured by traditional algorithms) and consequently its authenticity. Numerical experiments are presented, discussed and show the behavior of the method in terms of security and performance. The fast version of the algorithm has a performance comparable to AES, a popular cryptography program used commercially nowadays, but it is more secure, which makes it immediately suitable for general purpose cryptography applications. An internet page has been set up, which enables the readers to test the algorithm and also to try to break into the cipher.