Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games

Stability of matchings was proved to be a new cooperative equilibrium concept in Sotomayor (Dynamics and equilibrium: essays in honor to D. Gale, 1992). That paper introduces the innovation of treating as multi-dimensional the payoff of a player with a quota greater than one. This is done for the many-to-many matching model with additively separable utilities, for which the stability concept is defined. It is then proved, via linear programming, that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty and it may be strictly bigger than the set of dual solutions and strictly smaller than the core. The present paper defines a general concept of stability and shows that this concept is a natural solution concept, stronger than the core concept, for a much more general coalitional game than a matching game. Instead of mutual agreements inside partnerships, the players are allowed to make collective agreements inside coalitions of any size and to distribute his labor among them. A collective agreement determines the level of labor at which the coalition operates and the division, among its members, of the income generated by the coalition. An allocation specifies a set of collective agreements for each player.

Rotation-discriminating template matching based on Fourier coefficients of radial projections with robustness to scaling and partial occlusion

We consider brightness/contrast-invariant and rotation-discriminating template matching that searches an image to analyze A for a query image Q We propose to use the complex coefficients of the discrete Fourier transform of the radial projections to compute new rotation-invariant local features. These coefficients can be efficiently obtained via FFT. We classify templates in ""stable"" and ""unstable"" ones and argue that any local feature-based template matching may fail to find unstable templates. We extract several stable sub-templates of Q and find them in A by comparing the features. The matchings of the sub-templates are combined using the Hough transform. As the features of A are computed only once, the algorithm can find quickly many different sub-templates in A, and it is Suitable for finding many query images in A, multi-scale searching and partial occlusion-robust template matching. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences

In a decentralized setting the game-theoretical predictions are that only strong blockings are allowed to rupture the structure of a matching. This paper argues that, under indifferences, also weak blockings should be considered when these blockings come from the grand coalition. This solution concept requires stability plus Pareto optimality. A characterization of the set of Pareto-stable matchings for the roommate and the marriage models is provided in terms of individually rational matchings whose blocking pairs, if any, are formed with unmatched agents. These matchings always exist and give an economic intuition on how blocking can be done by non-trading agents, so that the transactions need not be undone as agents reach the set of stable matchings. Some properties of the Pareto-stable matchings shared by the Marriage and Roommate models are obtained.

The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules

A stable matching rule is used as the outcome function for the Admission game where colleges behave straightforwardly and the students` strategies are given by their preferences over the colleges. We show that the college-optimal stable matching rule implements the set of stable matchings via the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. For any other stable matching rule the strategic behavior of the students may lead to outcomes that are not stable under the true preferences. We then introduce uncertainty about the matching selected and prove that the natural solution concept is that of NE in the strong sense. A general result shows that the random stable matching rule, as well as any stable matching rule, implements the set of stable matchings via NE in the strong sense. Precise answers are given to the strategic questions raised.

Density profiles in the raise and peel model with and without a wall; physics and combinatorics

We consider the raise and peel model of a one-dimensional fluctuating interface in the presence of an attractive wall. The model can also describe a pair annihilation process in disordered unquenched media with a source at one end of the system. For the stationary states, several density profiles are studied using Monte Carlo simulations. We point out a deep connection between some profiles seen in the presence of the wall and in its absence. Our results are discussed in the context of conformal invariance ( c = 0 theory). We discover some unexpected values for the critical exponents, which are obtained using combinatorial methods. We have solved known ( Pascal`s hexagon) and new (split-hexagon) bilinear recurrence relations. The solutions of these equations are interesting in their own right since they give information on certain classes of alternating sign matrices.

Algorithms for Maximum Independent Set in Convex Bipartite Graphs

A bipartite graph G = (V, W, E) is convex if there exists an ordering of the vertices of W such that, for each v. V, the neighbors of v are consecutive in W. We describe both a sequential and a BSP/CGM algorithm to find a maximum independent set in a convex bipartite graph. The sequential algorithm improves over the running time of the previously known algorithm and the BSP/CGM algorithm is a parallel version of the sequential one. The complexity of the algorithms does not depend on |W|.