O conceito de vivência em Freud e Husserl

Este artigo visa explicitar as concepções freudiana e husserliana de “vivência” (Erlebnis). Por “vivência” entende-se genericamente um tipo fundamental de experiência do mundo. Esse tema, ainda que não diretamente explorado por Freud, tornou-se necessário em sua teoria desde a descoberta da etiologia da histeria no início dos anos 1890 à luz do método catártico: a da vivência traumática. Por outro lado, Husserl, a partir do problema filosófico de garantir a possibilidade do conhecimento universal e necessário, se viu obrigado a combater o naturalismo das ideias, em 1900, e o naturalismo da consciência, em 1913, em ambos os casos partindo de uma análise das vivências (intencionais). Mostrarei que a abordagem freudiana (natural-científica) visa explicar metapsicologicamente a vivência, ao passo que a abordagem husserliana pretende descrever a estrutura da vivência (intencional). Por fim, apontarei para algumas das grandes diferenças entre ambas as abordagens desse tema.

Person, existence and phenomenology: remarks on the conceptions of personalism of Emmanuel Mounier

This article aims to discuss the personalism of Emmanuel Mounier, especially his views on the person and existence, and its relation to phenomenology. Mounier does not refer to the influence of phenomenology on his thoughts. However, it is possible to notice that his philosophy was strongly influenced by phenomenological ideas. Personalism is a philosophy that says a person`s value as an absolute. The absolute here is understood as a purpose that gives meaning to all the political and social organization. Human existence is the starting point and fundamental postulate of personalism. This means that there is, therefore, a priority of the existence about the human nature, understanding this as an information ""ontological definitive"". This position is a requirement of epistemological reformulation, which means, within personalism, the attempt to develop a phenomenology of existence, located between the radical objectivism of the science and subjectivism of metaphysics.

Essential role of TM V and VI for binding the C-terminal sequences of Des-Arg-kinins

In the kallikrein-kinin and renin-angiotensin systems the main receptors, B-1 and B-2 (kinin receptors) and AT(1) and AT(2) (angiotensin receptors) respectively, are seven-transmembrane domain G-protein-coupled receptors. Considering that the B, agonists Des-Arg(9)-BK (Arg-Pro-Pro-Gly-Phe-Ser-Pro-Phe), Lys-desArg(9)-BK or Des-Arg(10)-KD (Lys-Arg-Pro-Pro-Gly-Phe-Ser-Pro-Phe) and the AT, agonist (Asp-Arg-Val-Tyr-lle-His-Pro-Phe) have the same two residues at the C-terminal region (i.e. Pro-Phe), we hypothesized that TM V and TM VI of the B-1 receptor could play an essential role in agonist binding and activity, being these regions receptor sites for binding the C-terminal sequences of Des-Arg-kinins similarly to that observed to AT, receptor. To investigate this hypothesis, we replaced Arg(212) for Ala at the top of the TM V and the sequence 274-282 (CPYHFFAFL) in TM VI of the rat kinin B, receptor by the 32 receptor homologous sequence, 289-297 (FPFQISTFL) and subsequently analyzed the consequences of these mutations by competition binding and functional assays. Despite correct expression, observed at the mRNA and protein level by RT-PCR and confocal microscopy, respectively, no agonist binding and function was verified for the mutated receptors. Therefore, our results suggest an important role for Arg(212) in the TM V and a region of TM VI of rat B, receptor in the interaction with the C-terminal residues of Des-Arg-kinins, similar to that observed with AngII. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.