Politics vs economics: unintended consequences of Governments’ interventions in airlines’ markets

Overlaying theories of market inefficiencies and/or failure onto airline economics indicates that the industry encounters at least seven of the indicators which have triggered interventions by national, multi-national or supranational governments (NMSGs) trying to resolve political, social or environmental problems. The NMSGs’ interventions aimed to resolve lack of competition, fill missing markets, and neuter the presence of negative externalities, free riders, social inequalities and moral panic. Desk research showed that their interventions (many lacking preliminary economic analysis) either intentionally solved and/or unintentionally triggered market inefficiencies or failures. It is possible that some of the interventions could eventually make advanced world airlines subsidise their advancing world competitors.

Clipped wings: corporate social and environmental responsibility in the airline industry

Within the developed world, airlines have responded to the advice of advocates for corporate social and environmental responsibility (CSER) to use the intertwined CSER dimensions of economics, society and environment to guide their business activities. However, disingenuously, the advocates and regulators frequently pay insufficient attention to the economics which are critical to airlines’ sustainability and profits. This omission pushes airlines into the unprofitable domain of CSERplus. The author identifies alleged market inefficiencies and failures, examines CSERplus impacts on international competition and assesses the unintended consequences of the regulations. She also provides innovative ideas for future-proofing airlines.　 Clipped Wings is a treatise for business professionals featuring academic research as well as industry anecdotes. It is written for airlines (including their owners, employees, passengers and suppliers), airports, trade associations, policy makers, educators, students, consultants, CSERplus specialists and anyone who is concerned about the future of competitive airlines.

The paradox of competition for airline passengers with reduced mobility (PRM)

Airline competition with customer service as product differentiator has forced down costs, air fares and investor returns. Two passenger markets operate in aviation: (a) able-bodied passengers for whom airlines compete and (b) passengers with reduced mobility (PRMs) – disabled by age, obesity or medical problems – for whom airlines do not compete. Government interference in the market intended to protect a minority of narrowly-defined PRMs has had unintended consequences of enabling increasing numbers of more widely-defined PRMs to access complimentary airline provisions. With growing ageing and overweight populations and long-haul travelling medical tourists such regulation could lead to even lower investors’ returns. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) (2013) examined the air transport value chain for competitiveness using Porter’s (2008) five forces but did not distinguish between able-bodied passengers and PRMs. Findings during an investigation of these two markets concurred with IATA-Porter that the markets for the bargaining powers of PRM buyers and PRM suppliers were highly competitive. However, in contrast to the IATA conclusions, intensity of competition, and threats from new entrants and substitute products for PRM travel were low. The conclusion is that airlines are strategically PRM defensive by omission. Paradoxically, the airline which delivers the best PRM customer service could become the least profitable.

The paradox of competition for airline passengers with reduced mobility (PRM)

Airline competition with customer service as product differentiator has forced down costs, air fares and investor returns. Two passenger markets operate in aviation: (1) able-bodied passengers for whom airlines openly compete and (2) passengers with reduced mobility (PRMs) – disabled by age, obesity or medical problems – for whom airlines do not compete. Government interference in the market intended to protect a minority of narrowly-defined PRMs has had unintended consequences of enabling increasing numbers of more widely-defined PRMs to access complimentary airline provisions. With growing ageing and overweight populations and long-haul travelling medical tourists such regulation could lead to even lower investors’ returns. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) (2013) examined the air transport value chain for competitiveness using Porter’s (2008) five forces but did not distinguish between able-bodied passengers and PRMs. Findings during an investigation of these two markets concurred with IATA-Porter that the markets for the bargaining powers of PRM customers and PRM suppliers were ‘highly competitive’. However, in contrast to the IATA conclusions the threats posed by new entrants, substitute products and intensity of competition for PRM passengers were all ‘low’. The conclusion is that airlines are strategically PRM defensive by omission. Paradoxically, the airline which delivers the best PRM customer service could become the least profitable.