Diversity in levels of intracellular total creatine and triglycerides in human skeletal muscles observed by 1H-MRS

We used1H-magnetic resonance spectroscopy to noninvasively determine total creatine (TCr), choline-containing compounds (Cho), and intracellular (IT) and extracellular (between-muscle fibers) triglycerides (ET) in three human skeletal muscles. Subjects' (n = 15 men) TCr concentrations in soleus [Sol; 100.2 ± 8.3 (SE) mmol/kg dry wt] were lower (P < 0.05) than those in gastrocnemius (Gast; 125.3 ± 9.2 mmol/kg dry wt) and tibialis anterior (TA; 123.7 ± 8.8 mmol/kg dry wt). The Cho levels in Sol (35.8 ± 3.6 mmol/kg dry wt) and Gast (28.5 ± 3.5 mmol/kg dry wt) were higher (P < 0.001 andP < 0.01, respectively) compared with TA (13.6 ± 2.4 mmol/kg dry wt). The IT values were found to be 44.8 ± 4.6 and 36.5 ± 4.2 mmol/kg dry wt in Sol and Gast, respectively. The IT values of TA (24.5 ± 4.5 mmol/kg dry wt) were lower than those of Sol (P < 0.01) and Gast (P < 0.05). There were no differences in ET [116.0 ± 11.2 (Sol), 119.1 ± 18.5 (Gast), and 91.4 ± 19.2 mmol/kg dry wt (TA)]. It is proposed that the differences in metabolite levels may be due to the differences in fiber-type composition and deposition of metabolites due to the adaptation of different muscles during locomotion.

On the 'inherent' character of the right of states to self-defence

While there is no lack of studies on the use of armed force by states in self-defence, its qualification as an ‘inherent right’ in article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations has received little scholarly attention and has been too quickly dismissed as having no significance. The present article fills this gap in the literature. Its purpose is not to discuss the limits to which article 51 or customary international law submit the exercise of the right of self-defence by states, but to examine what its 'inherent’ character means and what legal consequences it entails. The article advances two main arguments. The first is that self-defence is a corollary of statehood as presently understood because it is essential to preserving its constitutive elements. The second argument is that the exercise of the right of self-defence must be distinguished from the right itself: it is only the former that may be delegated to other states or submitted to limitations under customary international law and treaty law. The right of self-defence, however, cannot be alienated and it takes precedence over other international obligations, although not over those specifically intended to limit the conduct of states in armed conflict or over non-derogable human rights provisions.